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1. Introduction
1.1 Background
The world’s financial system is constantly under attack by both outside forces and
insider attacks. Over the past ten years the financial systems of the world has migrated
from traditional brick and mortar buildings to online banking, bill pay and commerce
(Benioff, 2005). This shift in transactions has prompted the world to take a serious look
at the health of the infrastructure that supports the world’s financial system.
Banking and finance has been named as two of the 11 critical infrastructures that
are vital to the existence of Americans by the Department of Homeland Security (Lewis,
2006). Banking and finance has been increasingly dependent on the use of information
technology and must be highly secure in order to maintain the confidentially, integrity,
and availability of banking data and personal data (Streff, 2007).
Data breaches affect millions of people each year, and frequently result in identity
theft and personal information being compromised. The Chronology of Data Breaches,
published by PrivacyRights.org, list that there have been 262,582,926 data breaches that
have involved sensitive information since January of 2005 (Chronology of Data
Breaches, 2009). Data breaches can result in the loss of personal information that can
lead to identity theft. Financial institutions, by nature, house personal information that
can and does result in identity theft after a data breach (Streff, 2007).
Government regulations and legislation oversee the banking and financial sector.
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act requires all financial institutions to conduct an information
technology risk assessment (RA) to identify security risks to non-public customer
information (The Gramm-Leach Bliley Act, 1999). Small and medium-sized financial
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institutions (SMFIs) struggle with this important exercise and often do not understand
how to adequately integrate the important act into their banking practices. Therefore,
community banks, credit unions and other SMFIs do not typically have a good
understanding of what represents real information security risk to their financial
institution, and what mitigating countermeasures should be deployed (Podhradsky, 2009).
The RA process identifies the risk associated with the information technology
assets of the financial institution, and demonstrates the level of security of each asset, and
for the financial institution as a whole. Banks also have a written information security
policy, sound security policy guidelines, and well-designed system architecture, as well
as provide for physical security, employee education, and testing, as part of an effective
program (FDIC FIL 68-99 , 1999). The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
issued this guidance in 1999 after the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) was enacted and
passed through Congress. Furthermore, the FDIC announced in June of 2003 that it was
revising the compliance examination process to focus increased attention on an
institution's compliance management system (FDIC FIL 81-05, 2005). Neither of these
Financial Institution Letters (FIL’s) from the FDIC provides any direction on how to
complete an information technology RA. Neither piece of guidance outlines a repeatable
management process to follow to identify threats and make compensating control
decisions. Therefore, financial institutions are left to their own devices in figuring out
how to conduct a thorough and accurate information technology RA. This becomes very
problematic at SMFIs as they typically do not have an information technology individual
on staff, let alone an information security professional who is educated and current on
information security threats, trends and countermeasures related to the banking industry
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(Podhradsky, 2009).

1.2 Problem Definition
Financial institutions, of all sizes, are required to conduct a risk assessment (RA)
every year by the FDIC. Large financial institutions, which are typically billions in
financial assets, have different abilities and needs compared to smaller financial
institutions which are typically millions in financial assets. However, according to the
FDIC, both institution sizes have the same regulations and requirements for risk
management. There are five specific problems this research aims to answer, which are the
following.
1.

Different size financial institutions have different resources available
to protect IT assets in terms of financial, staffing and time.

2.

Current RA practices are done to appease regulators, and not to add
value to help make decisions.

3.

Little guidance is given to financial institutions by the FDIC on how
to conduct a RA.

4.

Generic RA models require a high level of understanding that is
usually not found in small to medium sized financial institutions.

5.

Generic RA models available are mostly either asset or
organizational based, not both. SMFIs need a RA that addresses
both areas.

Large and small financial institutions have the same FDIC regulation but
different resources available in terms of IT staffing, IT budgets, and overall security
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needs yet overall the FDIC regulations are written in a one-size-fits-all environment.
Small and Medium Sized Financial Institutions (SMFIs) understand they are
required by the FDIC to conduct a RA, and they typically approach this process in a
manner to appease regulators. The RA process that SMFIs take does not typically result
in an accurate RA or add value to their organization (Streff, 2007). RAs for SMFIs need
to identify assets and service providers, outline the risk with each asset, list the
countermeasures applied to each asset and demonstrate how effective their current
mitigating approach is in reducing the risk to the financial institution (Podhradsky, 2009).
However, a majority of SMFIs handle the RA process in a completely different fashion
where bankers pass around an Excel spreadsheet and various people throughout the bank
list assets and the approach taken to secure the device (Streff, 2007). This process not
only results in a grossly inaccurate RA, but it also adds no value to the organization.
When organizations conduct RA’s in this manner, they are only completing this
assessment to conciliate government FDIC regulation, and not using it as a tool for their
overall risk management process (Streff, 2007).
SMFIs cannot be held solely accountable for the understated RA process. With
little guidance from the FDIC, they are approaching the RA process with the same regard
as the FDIC. If the FDIC demanded tighter regulations and an accurate assessment,
financial institutions would have no choice but to follow suit.
Generic RA models have been developed and deployed across several industries,
including banking; however generic RA models assume a high level of understanding
about banking assets, risks, threats, risk mitigation, and information security policy which
is typically found in larger financial institutions. This type of advanced knowledge is
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usually not found in management (Gautam, 1989). SMFIs need a different approach to
solving their information security RA process than their larger financial institutions
counterparts. The generic models implemented by larger financial institutions are not
applicable to smaller institutions, due to their IT staffing, IT budget, and IT security
limitations. A RA model for a SMFI should also include both an asset and organizational
assessment (Streff, 2007). Larger financial organizations have the financial and staffing
resources to conduct both an asset and organizational based assessment, however SMFIs
need to incorporate both assessments into one single assessment (Streff, 2007).

1.3 Objectives and Approach
The objectives for this research are to address the five challenges of facing SMFIs
when conducting a RA outlined in secion1.2. An RA model for SMFIs needs to address
FDIC regulations, IT staffing limitations, financial resource restrictions, knowledge
limitations, assets and the organization, all while being tailored towards the banking
industry. The new RA model, Small to Medium Entity Risk Assessment Model,
SMERAM, works to address the unique needs of SMFIs.
The first problem SMERAM aims to address is problem 1, different size financial
institutions have different resources available to protect IT assets. IT staffing limitations
are met with SMERAM as financial institutions do not need a dedicated IT department or
staff member on-site to complete the RA. Risk management is a management
responsibility and a member of the management team can conduct the RA (Streff, 2007).
SMERAM has been specifically created to be completed by both technical and nontechnical personnel. Other Generic RA models require a certified consultant or full time
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IT staff to complete the RA, while SMERAM does not. This unique characteristic of
SMERAM reduces the cost of implementation and maintenance which is not typically
seen in other generic RA models.
The smaller IT budgets associated with SMFIs are also factored into SMERAM.
Most generic RA models such as ISO, NIST, or COBIT require a certified consultant or
IT staff to complete the RA, while SMERAM does not, which results in reduced costs for
completing a valid and value added RA. An ISO certification for example, costs
upwards of $50,000 for a medium sized institution; this is well beyond the reach of most
SMFIs (Martin, 2002). Also, SMERAM does not have any subscription costs associated
with its implementation, which is unlike other generic RA models.
The second problem outlined in 1.2 that SMERAM addresses is the current
practices of conducting a RA in SMFIs. Currently, the majority of SMFIs handle the
FDIC regulated RA process in a manner that appeases regulators, not in a fashion that
helps the financial institution add value to their organization. SMERAM is designed to
show the financial institution what IT assets they have, what threats are associated with
those assets, and how mitigating practices can reduce the risk their IT assets impose.
From this information, the SMFI can determine what steps should be taken to further
secure their organization.
The third problem as outlined in 1.2 that SMERAM aims to address is that little
guidance is given to SMFIs by the FDIC. SMERAM meets FDIC FIL guidelines as it is
designed for the RA to be completed every year, and reviewed on an ongoing basis.
SMERAM encourages SMFIs to update their RA whenever there is a major change in
their network or information technology infrastructure, which keeps the RA an adaptive
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and living part of the information security program. This approach not only adds value to
the organization as it helps the financial institution identify and outline their current
security posture and allows them make informed decisions regarding their information
technology purchases and upgrades but also meets FDIC regulatory standards.
The fourth problem that SMERAM addresses is the knowledge limitations found
in SMFIs when dealing with information technology security. The FDIC states that risk
management is a management responsibility, as a result, the management teams in SMFIs
need to conduct the annual RA. In order to do this properly, the SMFI management team
will need assistance in assets, threats, and controls. Appendixes C, F, and E,
respectively, have this information for typical SMFIs.
The fifth problem SMERAM aims to address is most generic RA models are
either asset or organizational based, not both. SMERAM further adds value to the
financial institution as it completes both an asset and organizational RA. Not all generic
RA models evaluate security in both an asset and organizational level as SMERAM does.
This approach saves time and money for SMFIs as only one RA has to be completed.
The unique needs of SMFIs are documented in Table 1, Generic Models vs
SMERAM.
Table 1 Generic Models vs SMERAM

SMFI Needs

Generic Models

SMERAM

FDIC Federal

Not defined to

Meets FDIC guidelines as it

Institution Letters

financial

is honed specifically to the

organizations-

financial industry

applies to many
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industries

Usually needed,

Management Process- No

added cost

additional staff required

Credential

Usually needed,

Management Process- No

Consultant needed

added cost

additional staff required

Configured to

No

Assets/ Threats/

IT Staff

Countermeasures specific to

banking industry

banking industry
Asset or
Organizational

Varies

Both asset and organizational
based RA are completed with
SMERAM

1.4 Methodology
This research will utilize the design science research methodology, as an IT
artifact will be created. Hevner, et al. present the guidelines for design science research
in the paper “Design Science in Information Systems Research” for validation and
evaluation (Hevner, 2004). This research will employ each of the seven guidelines to
provide a methodical evaluation of the research IT artifact.
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The artifacts shaped from this research include a risk assessment model for
SMFIs. This model will be created and evaluated with Design Science guidelines.
The seven guidelines outlined in the “Design Science in Information Systems
Research” are listed in Table 2, along with the definition and the approach SMERAM
takes to meet the guidelines (Hevner, 2004).

Table 2 Hevner Design Science Guidelines

Guideline

Description

SMERAM

1- Design as an

Design-science research must

The artifact,

Artifact

produce a viable artifact in the

SMERAM, is created

form of a construct, a model, a

in accordance of

method, or an instantiation

Design Science
guidelines

2- Problem

The objective of design-

SMERAM was

Relevance

science research is to develop

designed to address the

technology-based solutions to

staffing and financial

important, and relevant

limitations of SMFIs

business problems

all while meeting and
exceeding FDIC FIL
regulation
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3- Design

The utility, quality, and

SMERAM was

Evaluation

efficacy of a design artifact

effectively tested and

must be rigorously

deployed in a

demonstrated via well-

community bank

executed evaluation methods
4- Research

Effective design-science

The SMERAM RA

Contributions

research must provide clear

model for SMFIs is the

and verifiable contributions in

contribution to the

the areas of the design artifact,

security and SMFI

design foundations, and/

fields

design methodologies

5- Research

Design-science research relies

SMERAM was built

Rigor

upon the application of

on accepted generic

rigorous methods in both the

RA models such as

construction and evaluation of

ISO, NIST, COBIT,

the design artifact

and CORAS while
being honed to the
financial industry

6- Design as a

The search for an effective

SMERAM was

Search Process

artifact requires utilization

developed through a

available means to reach

prototype environment
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7-

desired ends while satisfying

after studying various

laws in the problem

established generic RA

environment

models

Design-science research must

SMERAM is designed

Communication be presented effectively both
of Research

to be used effectively

to technology-orientated as

by both technical and

well as management-

non-technical

orientated audiences

personnel; the
intended audience is
bank management

This research will also employ the qualitative research method approach of case
study. A single case study was conducted to test the effectiveness of SMERAM in a
financial institution while addressing the unique needs of staffing and financial
limitations. Also, the overall quality of information technology assets along with the
organization as a whole was evaluated.
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2. Literature review
2.1 Background
Information technology is synonymous with responsibility in terms of daily
processes, upkeep, and upgrading. However, none is more important than information
security risk identification and mitigation. Although very little scientific research has
been conducted in response to information system risk mitigation.
The goal of this research is to define what a risk assessment is, support the
audience in developing an in-depth understanding of the risk assessment process while
emphasizing several seminal works pertaining to information technology risk assessment.
Also, several current generic RA for assessing risk in technology systems will be
discussed. Ultimately, it is the intention of this research to demonstrate the importance of
the information RA process and point out current gaps in the field in relation to generic
RA models. The research also produces a generic RA model that has been honed for the
use in SMFIs, the model is Small to Medium Entity Risk Assessment Model
(SMERAM). Finally, this research will conclude with several suggestions for further
research and development.
The study and analysis of risk is a customary practice throughout several key
industries such as insurance, medical, finance, economics along with many others. The
concept of studying, analyzing and scientifically outlining the risk assessment process
explicitly for use in safeguarding information systems have traditionally been
overshadowed in favor of more broadly applicable information security standards.
For the purpose of this research the definition of an information technology RA
will be as follows: Risk assessments are the process of accurately and consistently
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measuring threats, or the potential of threats with an information system (Streff, 2007).
Streff outlines that risk based management means that major decisions that are made
regarding information security analyze the impact a change will have in either increasing
or decreasing the amount of risk there is to informational assets in the bank (Streff,
2007).
Historically, when attempting to conduct an RA, organizations have been left to
sort through several weighty generic standards such as OCTAVE, CORAS, ISO, NIST,
or COBIT, among others. Attempting to apply these generic standards across all
industries, in an identical fashion, can make for a time consuming and frustrating
experience, especially for SMFIs. Many organizations, mostly smaller institutions, find
that attempting to implement a generic standard fails to adequately implement the
standard and as a result end up with throwing together parts of different standards, or
worse, no standard at all. By not implementing a scientific standard the company is
opening themselves up to failure with their information security program, which puts
their customer’s financial data in jeopardy (Streff, 2007).
As businesses continue to grow and become more dependent on large information
systems, managers and organizations must learn to effectively identify, and assess risks
to these systems. As pointed out in the article “Bayesian Probabilistic Risk Analysis”
(Ali, 1985) the process of risk management includes identifying a system’s weakness as
well as effectively reducing the probability of the particular system from being impacted
by the exposed weakness. Bayesian risk analyses were originally developed for use in
the nuclear power industry.
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A measurement of risk, according to Ali, can be determined by answering the following
four fundamental questions (Ali, 1985);


What can go wrong?



How frequently can it be expected to happen?



What would be it consequences?



How certain are we about the answers to the first three questions (Ali,
1985).

Although the use of technology and the advancement of the RA process have
drastically changed modern information system risk, the answers to these four questions
can still provide a highly accurate and useful assessment of information system risk (Ali,
1985).
Network intruders work tirelessly to develop the newest attacks patterns and
processes to exploit vulnerabilities and gain unauthorized access to networks. As a
result, organizations need to vigilantly work to protect their information system assets by
studying and learning the current attack processes (Myerson, 2002). It is not enough for
an organization to simply have a risk assessment process in place; your risk assessment
must be an active and adaptive part of the entire information security program
(Podhradsky, 2008). This includes, but is not limited to, regularly updating the process to
allow for flexibility in dealing with new threats and vulnerabilities (Myerson, 2002). If a
risk assessment is completed only once a year it is merely a snapshot of that point in
time, and it cannot be used as a valid and honest representation of the institutions security
posture. Whereas an adaptive and updated risk assessment will change when your

15
network or systems changes, this entails updating your risk assessment at least quarterly,
or whenever there is significant changes made to the network. This method will result in
an accurate information security risk assessment and current security posture for the
institution.
The ability to safely and accurately defend an information system depends upon
completely understanding the threats associated with that information system and
applying controls and commensurate with the defined level of risk. This process of risk
assessment helps organizations and managers appropriately spend time and money
defending and protecting assets which need it most. Ultimately risk assessment can be
seen as a productivity tool that saves the organization time, money along with their
reputation.
RA’s examine the impact and probability that threats pose to an information
system. A RA computes the probability of a specific threat taking place while also
determining the impact of the specific threat. When organizations complete a risk
assessment, they can begin to compute their risk level (Blakley, 2001).
There are several common fundamental themes within varying RA’s. For
example, Woemer states that risk should be calculated as risk = impact x probability
(Woerner, 2007). There are many different and widely used models to complete the
actual risk assessment. Some models are built into an automated tool, and some are
completed on paper. In the paper “Applications of Qualitative Modeling to KnowledgeBased Risk Assessment Studies”, Gautam, et al, the focus is on system failure to help
identify risk (Gautam, 1989). The authors showcase a qualitative modeling technique to
augment the RA process to assist in the design of an RA automated tool.
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Gautam et al believe that the mutual use of a knowledge based system and
qualitative problem solving can result in the development of a generic RA tool. They
further state that by designing a generic tool, it can be widely implemented across several
industries (Gautam, 1989). The issue with this approach within SMFIs is that by using a
generic tool, the process is not unique to any one industry. In order to complete an
accurate RA one would have to have all of the information about the information systems
within the organization. Whereas with a tool or model that is designed for the specific
audience there is a more user-friendly environment to complete the RA process.
Depending on the industry there are very specific information systems; banking, ethanol,
hospitals and education all have specific information systems tailored to their venue. A
generic tool would require much more time and resources to complete than a model or
tool that is tailored and designed for the industry. For SMFIs to use a generic tool they
would have to first have the understanding of the information systems in within their
organization and second have the manpower to use the tool, however they typically have
limited resources on both fronts.
Organizations are continuing to lean on information systems for all aspect of their
business, and they need to understand the risk associated with their business systems.
Conducting a risk assessment will show the organization how to adequately protect their
information and business assets.
One of the primary advantages of developing a knowledge based system using
fault tree analysis is that it provides for an excellent tool to model “what-if” scenarios.
By examining the potential system failures organizations and managers can get a broad

17
and accurate picture of potential risk. The organization would then have a clear picture
as to where to invest their information security dollars (Streff, 2008).
Bob Blakley, Ellen McDermott and Dan Geer discuss the process of measuring
risk through the concept of Annualized Loss Expectation. (Blakley et al., 2001)
Annualized Loss Expectation helps to quantify risk in terms of a financial definition
where companies predict a specific value or cost associated with the occurrence of a
particular risk. Using this model, an organization calculates risk by multiplying a
specific dollar amount against the probability of the risk’s occurrence. Cost is estimated
by totaling both the direct and indirect dollar amounts, over the course of one year, which
are related to the occurrence of the risk. Examples of direct and indirect dollar amounts
include physical damage, equipment replacement, labor costs to repair, decreased
employee productivity, lost sales, reputation damage, and legal costs. Probability is
determined by weighing the likelihood of a risk event on a 1 to “x” scale. This
probability is then multiplied by the cost associated with the annual loss resulting in a
final dollar value which is representative of risk for the particular system.
For example, the cost of a hacker defacing a company website is determined to be
$2,000,000 while the probability of a hacker defacing the company’s website is
determined to be 1 in 15,000, the ALE measurement would be ($2,000,000 x 1/15,000 =
$133)
Others have taken a different approach to defining the risk assessment process.
Ye, et al, presented a six step approach to tackling risk assessment. (Ye, Barry, & Betsy,
2006) Their workflow begins with identifying a cost factor rating system. Once the
rating system has been defined, risks are identified. Next the step is assigning risk
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probability, this is followed by analyzing risk impact, at this point an overall risk can be
normalized on a scale from 1-100. The scale of 1-100 can then be disseminated into the
following categories. Systems with an overall risk from:


0-5 are considered “low risk”,



5-15 are marked as “moderate risk”,



15-50 are said to be “high risk” while



50-100 should be labeled as “very high risk”. (Ye et al., 2006).

The final step is to offer ways of reducing the presented risk. While Ye et. al., offer a
systematic approach for the RA process, SMEFI’s would find the approach daunting and
un manageable for their IT RA. The result would be inaccurate RA results, which would
result in the wrong protection profile be adapted for the SMEFI. This would put
customers financial information in jeopardy.
Organizations often make the assumption that increased budgeting and spending
on security investments will lead to a direct decrease in overall information system risk.
This thinking is clearly demonstrated in the article “A model for evaluating IT Security
Investments” (Cavusoglu, Mishra, & Raghunathan, 2004). The level of risk obtained
from an organization’s completed RA often determines the organization’s willingness to
invest in appropriate security controls. This type of organizational philosophy is another
reason demonstrating the importance of an appropriate and accurate risk assessment,
there are clear implications to an organizations financial health and bottom line.
Along this same line of thought, Hamdi and Boudriga (Hamdi & Boudriga, 2003)
explain that the process of assessing risk is often too difficult to perform accurately
without the use of automated software. Because of the complexity involved in accurate
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RA, they argue there is a need for the creation of an automated system. According to
Hamdi & Boudriga, the tool must ultimately assist in security decisions. Furthermore
the authors point out that risk assessment can be sub-divided into two categories.
Qualitative risk assessment expresses risk in subjective terminology while quantitative
risk assessment attempts to assign values associated with the occurrence of a particular
threat or risk.

2.2 Disastrous Results from Under-valuing the Risk Assessment Process
The result of undervaluing the RA process and not having proper documentation
can lead to devastating results. Organizations, whether non-profit or for profit, that have a
data breach face much more than monetary losses, a hit to their reputation also occurs.
Table XX below is an overview of large data breaches that may have been avoided if
proper controls were enacted to secure their data.
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Table 3 Historic Data Breaches

Historic Data Breaches
Year

Company

Number of Accounts
Compromised

2006

Veterans Administration

26.5 million plus

2007

TJX Enterprises

100 million

2008

Heartland Payment

130 million

Systems / Hannaford
Payment Systems

An example of this pressing issue is the Veterans Administrations who had a
laptop stolen that contained confidential records of over 26.5 million retired veterans
(Burger, 2006). The laptop was stolen from the home of a Veterans Affairs employee
and resulted in the largest security breach in the history of the United States Government
(Burger, 2006). It is important to note that this was not the result of a hacker or script
kiddy but rather the result of simple human error and physical security issues (Burger,
2006).

Proper documentation and a risk assessment process should have prevented the

employee from leaving the government office with such a valuable asset. Further
documentation should have mandated that storing that type of secure data on a portable
device is prohibited (Burger, 2006). Information which is considered secure in nature,
such as personal identifying information, belongs on a server, with proper credentials
used to access the information.
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For an organization to defend an information system they must have an
understanding of the risk associated with the asset along with the knowledge for applying
the appropriate controls to mitigate risk. This aspect of the RA process assists an
organization in appropriately using resources to defend and protect organizational assets
and data. Ultimately RA’s can be seen as a productivity tool that saves the organization
time, money, and reputation, which would have served the department of Veteran Affairs
a substantial amount of money, time, resources, and a hit to their reputation (Burger,
2006).
TJX Enterprises had one of the largest data breaches ever recorded. A TJX
insider, requesting anonymity had the following to say about the infamous security
breach that affected over 100 million accounts (Dawson, 2007):

"Poorly secured in-store computer kiosks are at least partly
to blame for acting as gateways to the company's IT systems,
the kiosks, located in many of TJX's retail stores, let people
apply for jobs electronically but also allowed direct access
to the company's network, as they weren't protected by
firewalls. 'The people who started the breach opened up the
back of those terminals and used USB drives to load
software onto those terminals,' says the source. In a March
filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission, TJX
acknowledged finding 'suspicious software' on its computer
systems. (Dawson, 2007)"
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The TJX data breach, which affected over 100 million credit card accounts, was
discovered in 2007 (PrivacyRights, 2009). TJX lost not only money, but also credibility

Figure 1- Types of Fraud / Security Breaches

due to their inadequate information security policies. Hackers gained access to the credit
and debit card sever that house millions of card numbers. In addition to the credit card
numbers, names, addresses, social security numbers and drivers license numbers were
also stolen from TJX (Dawson, 2007). This type of personal information is what hackers
look to steal when they are trying to steal an identity (Streff, 2006).
Heartland, another example of a data breach involving credit / debit card fraud
occurred in 2008. Heartland payment systems processes over 100 million transactions

23
each month, as a result of that magnitude of data crossing their lines, it was very difficult
to be able to identify the amount of data compromised due to inadequate security. At last
count, the Heartland data breach affected over 130 million records when combined with
the Hannaford breach (Chronology of Data Breaches, 2009).
According to Barnett Insurance agency, in 2008 credit card fraud accounts for
over 28% of reported security breaches and fraud reports. The banking sector had 18% of
reported security breaches, which means that overall the financial sector is accountable
for over 56% of all security data breaches and fraud reports This is indicated in Figure 1,
Types of Fraud / Security Breaches.
Data Breaches, which are a direct result of inadequate security, can be reduced
when a proper RA is completed (Data Security Breach Statistics, 2009). The RA process
identifies risk associated with information technology assets, which demonstrates the
security level of each asset (Streff, 2007). When organizations fail to properly secure
each information technology asset the results can be disastrous.

Figures 2, 3, and 4

below depict the amount of records comprised in 2006, 2007, and 2008 respectively as a
result of a data breach (Data Security Breach Statistics, 2009).
In 2006, theft was the overall leader in records compromised followed malicious
insiders, carless/ untrained insider, hacking and 3rd party service providers followed (Data
Security Breach Statistics, 2009).

Theft accounted for over 35,000,000 breached

records. Theft, which is part of physical security, should be a part of any RA process.
Controls should also be in place for malicious insiders, hacking and 3rd party service
providers which are all part of an overall RA process.
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Figure 1 Records Compromised by Breach Source-2006

In 2007, hacking was the overall leader in records compromised followed by
malicious insiders, theft, carless/ untrained insider, 3rd party service providers followed
worms and viruses (Data Security Breach Statistics, 2009).
100,000,000 breached records.

Hacking accounted for over
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Figure 2 Records Compromised by Breach Source- 2007

In 2008, similar to 2007, hacking was the overall leader in records compromised
followed by malicious insiders, theft, carless/ untrained insider, and 3rd party service
providers (Data Security Breach Statistics, 2009).
180,000,000 breached records.

Hacking accounted for over
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Figure 3 Records Compromised by Breach Source- 2008

Over 2006, 2007, and 2008 hacking, malicious insiders, theft, and careless or
untrained insiders resulted in billions of compromised accounts (Data Security Breach
Statistics, 2009). These compromised accounts can contain personal identifying
information such as SSN’s, names, addresses, date of birth that is used to steal identities
(Podhradsky, 2008). By have a valid and defined RA in process, the number of
compromised records will naturally decrease. RA assess the overall risk with an asset and
demonstrate where security resources should be allocated (Streff, 2007).
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2.3 Regulation
The financial industry is a highly regulated environment due to the financial and
personal information that is stored at many financial institutions. This information has an
inherent attraction to identity thieves. Table 4, Regulation for Financial Institutions,
outlines the major regulation that governs financial institutions, whether small or large.
Table 4 Regulation for Financial Institutions

Regulation

Purpose or Intent

FDIC FIL 68-99

FDIC FIL 68-99 states banks should have a
written information security policy, sounds
security policy guidelines, and well-designed
system architecture, as part of an overall
security policy. However, it does not state
how to conduct a RA, or with what
methodology. Available in Appendix A.

Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act

Requires all financial institutions to conduct

(GLBA)

an information security RA to identify risk to
non-public customer information. Available in
Appendix C.

FDIC FIL 81-05

FDIC 81-05 was written to focus more
attention on the RA process and information
security program for information technology
assets. However, there still isn’t a repeatable
management process listed for the RA
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process. Available in Appendix B.

The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) of 1999 requires all financial institutions
to conduct an information technology risk assessment to identify security risks to nonpublic customer information (The Gramm-Leach Bliley Act, 1999). Small and mediumsized financial institutions struggle with this important exercise and often do not
understand how to adequately integrate the act into their banking practices. Therefore,
community banks, credit unions and other small and medium-sized financial institutions
do not have a good understanding of what represents real information security risk to
their financial institution, and what mitigating countermeasures should be deployed.
The RA process provides a framework for establishing policy guidelines and
identifying the risk assessment tools and practices that may be appropriate for an
institution (Streff, 2007). According to the FDIC banks should have a written information
security policy, sound security policy guidelines, and well-designed system architecture,
as well as provide for physical security, employee education, and testing, as part of an
effective program (FDIC FIL 68-99 , 1999). The FDIC issued this guidance in 1999 after
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley ACT was passed. Further, The FDIC announced in June of
2003 that it was revising the compliance examination process to focus increased attention
on an institution's compliance management system (FDIC FIL 81-05, 2005).
Together these two pieces of regulation are the sole guidelines from the FDIC and
can be found in the appendix A and appendix B respectively of this paper. Neither of
these two Financial Institution Letters from the FDIC provides any direction on how to
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complete an information technology RA. Nor does either piece of guidance outline a
repeatable management process to follow to identify threats and make compensating
control decisions. Therefore, small and medium sized financial institutions are left to
their own devices in figuring out how to conduct a thorough, accurate information
technology risk assessment. This becomes very problematic at small and medium sized
financial institutions as they typically do not have an information technology individual
on staff, let alone an information security professional who is educated and current on
information security threats, trends and countermeasures.
In August of 2005, the FDIC updated the procedures and processes for member
banks to include a risk-focused examination concentrating on the area of information
technology for 3rd party entities. This was the first update to their Financial Institution
Letters that dealt specifically with information security in nearly 8 years; to date, there
have not been any other updates.
The highlights of the 2003 FIL focused on member banks implementing an
information security program as well as asking financial institutions to define a process
for securing information assets (FDIC FIL 81-05, 2005). The FDIC’s new Information
Technology Risk Management Program (IT-RMP) applied universally to all FDIC
Insured banks despite their level of technology or the size of the financial institution. As
outlined in the FIL-81-2005 (FDIC FIL 81-05, 2005). The process of conducting a
technology focused risk assessment is specifically listed as a requirement for compliance
with the IT-RMP FDIC FIL 81-05 can be found in Appendix A.
The FDIC stopped short of spelling out the specific details for “how to” conduct
an information system risk assessment, rather they choose to let each institution follow its
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own path for assessing risk. There is also no guidance on the use of an automated tool to
aid in their assessment process. This causes serious issues to SMFIs due to their limited
knowledge and resources to conduct a viable risk assessment.

2.5 Generic Risk Assessment Models
National Institute of Standards and Technology
The National Institute of Standards and Technology, NIST, attempt’s to promote
guidance for development of technical standards and processes. In July of 2002, NIST
introduced a special publication directed towards the development of risk management
for information technology systems. In the publication, NIST outlines and defines the
process of risk assessment as not only a key component to securing information systems
but also clearly states that the process is a management responsibility (Stoneburner,
2002). This new framework suggests that technology risk assessments should be
conducted by an organization’s management team, and not necessarily its technical
support staff.
Similar to the FDIC, NIST defines risk assessment as the first step of an overall
risk management plan. NIST incorporates the RA process into the system development
life cycle (SDLC). NIST defines risk assessment as “the likelihood of a given threatsource’s exercising a particular potential vulnerability and the resulting impact of that
adverse event on the organization” (Stoneburner, 2002). In order to accurately assign a
risk rating, NIST states that an organization must measure both probability and impact
(Stoneburner, 2002). Determining the probability measurement requires an organization
to examine their unique vulnerabilities, particular threats, and individual controls for each
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system. In order to assign and produce an impact score, the organization must rate the
criticality and sensitivity of each system. Specifically, NIST describes 9 primary steps in
the risk assessment process which are outlined in Table 5, NIST Risk Assessment Model
(Stoneburner, 2002).

Table 5 NIST

NIST Step
1- System Characterization

Description
Characterization of the IT system being
analyzes along with the current security and
system boundary

2- Threat Identification

A threat statement containing an overview of
threat sources that could compromise system
vulnerabilities

3- Vulnerability
Identification

A overview of system vulnerabilities that be
leveraged by potential threat sources listed in
step 2

4- Control Analysis

A overview of current or future controls
implemented on IT systems to mitigate
potential vulnerabilities and reduce the
impact of any successfully compromised
vulnerabilities

5- Likelihood

Likelihood rating, such as high, medium and
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Determination
6- Impact Analysis

low
A range of high, medium and low applied to
an impact

7- Risk Determination

The risk level in terms of high, medium or
low

8- Control
Recommendations
9- Results Documentation

Control recommendations and other
alternative solutions to mitigate risk
The risk assessment report which includes
threats, and counteracting vulnerabilities.
Also risk measurements and
recommendations for further control
implementation
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Figure 4 NIST RA STEPS
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International Standards Organizations (ISO)
The International Standards Organization, ISO, has developed a risk assessment
process that is outlined in Table 6, ISO Risk Assessment Model.

Table 6 ISO Risk Assessment Model

ISO Step
Security Policy

Description
The security policy of the
organization is both created and
evaluated.

An example is the

organizations password policy.
Organizational Security

Security at the organization level,
not just the system or asset level.
Examples are a business continuity
plan and Information Security
Programs.

Asset Classification and

Assets are classified depending on

Control

their security needs. An example is
assigning ownership for business
assets.

Personnel Security

The security risk from people is
evaluated and calculated. An
examples is non-disclosure
agreements with new employees.
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Physical and Environmental

The security of assets and the

Security

organization is evaluated at the
physical level. An example is
access control to a server room
using keys or biometrics.

Communications and

Used to ensure the correct and

Operations Management

secure operation of information
processing facilities. Examples are
backup policies and documentation
of business plans.

Access Control

Access control is established for
assets based on personnel needs.
An example is allowing only
specific personnel access to
information technology assets such
as network shares or routers.

Systems Development

Software development creates and
assigns ownership to information
systems. An example is controlling
software code during the software
development lifecycle.

Business Continuity

The creation and validation of a
practiced plan for how an
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organization will recover after a
natural or man-made disruption.
Developing, testing, and training on
the Business Continuity plan is
essential for reduced downtime.
An example is the Y2K scare that
occurred in the late 90’s; businesses
worked to protect their information
technology assets.

The ISO standard is often referred to as a “mile wide, and inch deep (Quality
Management Cocktail: ISO, Lean, Six Sigma)”. The ISO standards cover many topics,
but none in depth. This results in confusion on the best way to adequately protect
information security assets by conducting a risk assessment.
The ISO standard is often referred to as “a mile wide and an inch deep
(Westguard, 2005).” ISO lacks in the area of asset management; the standard tells you to
inventory your assets but does not lay out a recommended process. The lack of concern
of asset management is a valid concern of ISO. Many data breaches are a direct result to
the lack proper asset management, the VA is a fantastic example of what the lack of asset
management can result it. The VA had over 26.5 million records compromised due to
inadequate asset management. (A Chronology of Data Breaches). With such a high rate
of data breached related to the loss of assets, not having my information related to asset
management within the ISO standard is a great concern.
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The access control section of the ISO model includes a great section on including
mobile technology. This is important because in addition to physical access to mobile
technology, regular access is needed. Another area of concern would by cryptography.
The ISO standard does not have any significant reference to cryptography, the CISSP
standard has cryptography as its own domain which is outlined in over 100 pages (Peltier,
2005). Also there is little discussion on wireless access. With wireless access becoming
more prevalent every day with lack of consideration on wireless standards is also a
concern.

Cost of Risk Assessment Software (CORAS)
CORAS is a standard developed by a consortium of European Union members in
an effort to improve and streamline the RA process. CORAS has a strong emphasis on
maintaining the “confidentiality, integrity, availability and non-repudiation,
accountability, authenticity, and reliability of IT systems (Siv-Hilde Houmb)”. CORAS
works toward considerations for both human operators and the information systems. The
CORAS framework relies greatly on the use of modeling to provide the risk assessment.
The methodology has implemented Unified Modeling Language (UML) along with
diagrams to define associations.

The CORAS framework is a 4 part series as

demonstrated in Table 7, CORAS Risk Assessment Framework.
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Table 7 CORAS

CORAS Steps

Description

System Risk Documentation

Risks that are associated with
specific assets are documented and
categorized.

Risk Management Process

Integrates risk management
practices into the overall RA
process. This includes
confidentiality, integrity,
availability and non-repudiation,
accountability, authenticity, and
reliability of IT systems.

Risk Integration and

Risk analysis is tightly integrated

Developmental Process

into a UML and RM-ODP setting

Tool Integration

The CORAS RA process involves
integrating a predefined tool into
the RA process. The tool has been
developed by the CORAS
development team.

One of the unique characteristics of this type of risk assessment is that it
combines different aspects from several types of risk assessments (Siv-Hilde Houmb).
(Eheo Dimitrakos)
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Figure 5 CORAS Methodology

Control Objectives for Information and related Technology
The Control Objectives for Information and related Technology (COBIT) is a risk
assessment framework developed by the Information Systems Audit and Control
Association (ISACA), and is outlined in Table 8, COBIT Risk Assessment Framework.
COBIT , an IT governance framework, is a supporting toolset that allows upper
management to bridge the gap between technical issues, control requirements, and
business risks. COBIT lays the foundation for clear policy development and good practice
policy for information systems throughout the entire organizations. COBIT emphasizes
the importance for regulatory compliance, regardless of industry, and assists the
organization in increasing the value derived from information technology systems
(ISACA).

40
Table 8 COBIT

COBIT Step

Description

Plan and Organize

Defines a strategic IT plan and
direction which includes
information architecture,
technological direction, IT
Processes, organization and
relationships related to IT.

Acquire and Implement

This step involves identifying
current IT requirements, acquiring
the appropriate technology, and
integrating it throughout the
organizations business processes.
This step also includes the creation
of a maintenance plan that
organizations should implement in
order to extend the life of an IT
system and its components.

Deliver and Support

This step focuses on the delivery
aspects of the information system.
Execution of applications and
results of execution are included in
this step. This step includes security

41
issues and training.
Monitor & Evaluate

A company’s overall strategy in
assessing the unique needs of the
organization and effectiveness of
the current IT system is evaluated.
The organization needs to determine
if the initial purpose for purchasing
the IT asset has been meet and if it
meets the objectives for which it
was designed. The asset also needs
to evaluate the controls necessary to
comply with regulatory
requirements
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Figure 6 COBIT Framework

COBIT also attempts to account for some “human” risk by asking the assessment
process to include questions about job satisfaction, potential lay-offs, and attitudes
towards ethics. Including this part in the RA process is important, because human error
accounts for the majority of data breaches (Chronology of Data Breaches, 2009).
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Operationally Critical, Threat, Asset and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE)
Finally, OCTAVE is a risk analysis approach which attempts to define
information system risk by evaluating the risk based on four elements; asset, threat,
impact and vulnerability (Alberts, 2002). OCTAVE was created at Carnegie Mellon
University in conjunction with the Software Engineering Institute. The OCTAVE Risk
Assessment framework is outlined in Table X, OCTAVE Risk Assessment Framework.

Table 9 OCTAVE

OCTAVE Step

Description

Asset

The organization determines the
information technology assets they
have.

Threat

The organization determines the
threats that are inherent to each
information technology asset. Threats
include man made or natural
disasters.

Impact

The organization determines the
chances each threat has of occurring.
For example, if the organization is in
the Midwest, there is a low chance of
a typhoon hitting the organization.
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Vulnerability Evaluation

The organization determines how
vulnerable their information systems
are and they rank them in the order
controls should be applied.

With OCTAVE, the first step in managing risk is to understand what the risks are
for the organization's key assets. The organization’s mission statement is also analyzed
in relation to the risk assessment process, meaning that mission critical assets are
protected more than non mission critical assets. Once assets are identified, organizational
personnel can draft plans to mitigate the inherent risks that will have the highest impact
on the organization's assets (Dorofee).
OCTAVE’S four steps; Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation outline the
essential steps in a systematic, comprehensive, context-driven information security risk
assessment (Dorofee). When implementing the OCTAVE RA, an organization can make
information-protection decisions based on risks to the confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of critical information technology assets (OCTAVE Information).
Organizations that implement the OCTAVE RA model include the United States
Department of Defense as well as the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) of
the United Kingdome Ministry of Defense. In addition to these notable organizations
others include those in health care as OCTAVE supports HIPPA compliance, insurance,
and many others (OCTAVE Information).
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Asset

Vulnerability
Evaluatoin

Octave

Threat

Impact

Figure 7 OCTAVE Framework

As demonstrated in the preceding section, completing an accurate risk assessment
is both valuable and necessary for an organization and its ability to properly protect their
information systems. Upon completion of the RA process the organization and
management staff will be ready to make informed decisions with regard to budgeting,
staffing and resource management. A well defined RA leads to a deeper and more
complete understand of both the overall level of risk associated with the implemented
technology as well as the risks associated with each individual system along with the
organization.
Generic Risk Assessment Models available for deployment in financial
institutions are many; the highlighted models are ISO, NIST, COBIT, OCTAVE, and
CORAS. These models are heavily adopted into many large industries including large
financial institutions. While these models provide a highly accurate RA model for these
organizations, they are not as adaptable to smaller financial institutions. Small to
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medium sized financial institutions have unique needs in terms of financial resources,
staffing resources, an overall ability to implement a large generic RA mode that is not
honed to their institution (Podhradsky, 2009).
As demonstrated in the preceding sections, completing an accurate risk
assessment is both valuable and necessary for an organization and its ability to properly
protect their information system assets. Upon completion of the risk assessment process
the organization and management staff will be ready to make precise and informed
decisions with regard to budgeting, staffing and resource management. A well defined
risk assessment leads to a deeper and more complete understand of both the overall level
of risk associated with the implemented technology as well as the risks associated with
each individual system.
Blakley, McDermott and Geer (2002) suggest that an organization has four
options when addressing each risk. The first option for managing risk is “Liability
Transfer”. This occurs when a business is able to convey the risk to another party outside
of the organization, effectively removing the responsibility or accountability for the
particular risk. Most often this is accomplished through use of a disclaimer or other type
of binding agreement. A second option for addressing risk is through “Indemnification”.
Indemnifying risks is effectively insuring the organization against the occurrence of a
particular risk. The third option identified by Blakely et. al, is “Mitigation”. This is the
process of reducing identified risks through procedure, processes, or controls. It is
important to note that mitigation can be used to specifically reduced the impact,
probability, or both impact and probability of a risk. The final option for addressing risk
is “Retention”. This is essentially an organization’s acceptance of a given risk. The
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specific risk is acknowledged and documented during the risk assessment process but no
further steps are taken to reduce the current level of risk. This path is typically chosen
when the probability or impact of a risk occurring are very small. Retention is also a
viable option when the “return on risk reduction spending” does not produce a
meaningful return.

2. 5 Evaluation of Risk Assessment Models
The process of comparing and evaluating various generic RA models is outlined
In the paper “A Framework for Comparing Different Information Security Risk Analysis
Methodologies.” This framework aims to provide organizations with guidance in
selecting a suitable RA model. While the overall goal of identifying and classifying risk
remains consistent across organizations, each may have different needs and requirements
when it comes to assessing risk (Labuschagne, 2005).When attempting to choose a
methodology Benoit recommends comparing the various approaches by answering five
distinct questions, which are outlined in Table 10, Labuschagne Risk Assessment
Evaluation.
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Table 10 Labuschagne Risk Assessment Evaluation

Labuschagne Risk Assessment Evaluation

Will the risk assessment is completed by examining one asset at
time or if several assets are grouped together to assess risk

Where in the methodology is risk analysis done? Due to various
models requiring different degrees of information, the answer to
this question will give an organization the ability to differentiate
between preparation time and the overall accuracy of a risk
assessment

Who will complete the risk assessment? Some risk assessments
will be completed by internal personal while others rely
extensively on experts who are external to the organization

What formulas are used to calculate risk

Is the output is relative or absolute? As an example of this is
some RA’s may have a value of “high” while others will
compute a specific number
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When attempting to choose a methodology Vorster and Labuschagne suggest
comparing the various approaches by answering five distinct questions, which are the
following:
1. “Does the risk assessment examine risk to each asset individually, or
does it group assets?” The first question seeks to determine whether the
RA is completed by examining one asset at time or if several assets are
grouped together to assess risk. This is important for assessing the
overall risk of the information system assets.
To determine if the RA conducts the analysis on a single asset or group
of asset the research can review the final results. If the result of the
analysis if the results review each assets, then the RA is based on a single
asset, however if the results group assets into systems or profiles the RA
is based on a group of assets.
If the organization employing the methodology prefers a quicker
analysis, than the organization should adopt an RA model that completes
the analysis on a group of assets.
Scale of Criteria:
1- Indicates that the risk analysis is completed on an individual
asset
2- Indicates that the risk analysis is completed on a group of
assets
2.

“Where in the methodology is risk analysis done?” Various RA models
require different degrees of information, the answer to this question will
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allow an organization to differentiate between preparation time and the
overall accuracy of a risk assessment.
The time invested to complete the risk assessment is important for the
institutions to consider.
The accuracy of the RA is also a very important consideration. Both the
time it takes to complete the assessment and the overall accuracy are a
trade-off according to Vorster and Labuschagne.
Scale of criteria:
Scale from 1-3- Trade-off from time and accuracy
If time is most important1- Risk analysis is conducted after extensive preparation
2- Risk analysis is conducted after some preparation
3- Risk analysis is conducted after little preparation
If accuracy is most important1- Risk analysis is conducted after little preparation
2- Risk analysis is conducted after some preparation
3- Risk analysis is conducted after extensive preparation
3. “Who will complete the risk assessment?” The framework calls for
differentiating methodologies by classifying who will complete the risk
assessment. Some risk assessments will be completed by internal
personal while others rely extensively on experts who are external to the
organization.
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Depending on the risk assessment model, the assessment is either
conducted by external experts or internal staff. Both the cost and
expertise is conducted in one category due to the nature of the trade-off;
if cost is most important, the analysis is most likely conducted by internal
staff opposed to external experts.
Scale from 1-3- Trade-off from cost and expertise
If cost is most important1- Risk analysis is conducted by external experts
2- Risk analysis is conducted by both external and internal
people
3- Risk analysis is conducted by internal people
If expertise is most important1- Risk analysis is conducted by internal people
2- Risk analysis is conducted by both external and internal
people
3- Risk analysis is conducted by external experts

4. “What formulas will be used to calculate risk?” Once this previous
question, question 3, has been answered an organization should compare
the various types of risk assessment based on what specific formulas are
used to calculate risk. This will allow the organization to determine how
risk is calculated for their adopted RA model.
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Organizations need to determine what type of formula is used to
calculated risk, which indicates the complexity of the risk analysis.
If an organization only needs basic RA values from analysis than they
need to adopt a model that uses an expected value matrix; an example is
OCTAVE.
On the other hand, if an organization needs detailed results form the RA,
then they should implement model that uses extensive formulas.
The organization needs to determine the trade-off of between accuracy
and simplicity for their chosen RA.
Scale of criteria:
If simplicity is most important1- Risk analysis integrates extensive mathematical
calculations
2- Risk analysis integrates a little simple mathematical
calculations
3- Risk analysis integrates no mathematical calculations
If accuracy is most important1- Risk analysis integrates no mathematical calculations
2- Risk analysis integrates a little simple mathematical
calculation
3- Risk analysis integrates extensive mathematical
calculations
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5. “Is the methodologies output is relative or absolute?” As an example,
some risk assessments may result with a value of “high” while others will
present the organization with a specific number risk number.
Absolute ratings can be compared, for example, if asset A has a value of
35, and asset B has a value to 70, it is fair to say that asset B has twice
the risk of asset A.
Relative ratings have ratings that might indicated that asset A and asset B
both have a rating of “high”, but that is all that can be said about the two
assets.
The trade off between the ranking of risk and the indication of difference
between the risk need to be evaluated and decided on by the organization
adopting the model.
Scale of criteriaIf ranking the risks is most important1- Analysis of results are able to be compared
2- Analysis of results are not able to be compared
If ranking the risks need to be comparable1- Analysis of results are not able to be compared
2- Analysis of results are able to be compared
Labuschagne’s approach was used to evaluate the overall effectiveness of generic
RA models such as ISO, NIST, COBIT, OCTAVE, and CORAS into SMFIs.
Labuschagne’s approach is identified in Table 11, Labuschangne’s Risk below.

ISO

NIST

COBIT

Assessment Evaluation

CORAS

Labuschagne Risk

OCTAVE

Table 11 Labuschagne Risk

1

1

2

1

2

1- Time

2- Time

1- Time

1- Time

1- Time

3- Accuracy

2- Accuracy

3-Accuracy

3- Accuracy

3- Accuracy

Whether risk analysis is done
on single assets or groups of
assets: Scale (1 or 2)
Weight= .2

Where in the methodology is
risk analysis done?
Scale (1-3)
Weight = .2
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People involved in the risk

3- Cost

3- Cost

3- Cost

2- Cost

2- Cost

1- Expense

1- Expertise

1- Expertise

2- Expertise

2- Expertise

3- Simplicity

3- Simplicity

1- Simplicity

2- Simplicity

2- Simplicity

1- Accuracy

1- Accuracy

3- Accuracy

2- Accuracy

2- Accuracy

2- Not

2- Not

2- Not

1- Not

1- Not

Comparable

Comparable

Comparable

Comparable

Comparable

1- Comparable

1- Comparable

1- Comparable

2- Comparable

2- Comparable

assessment? Scale (1-3)
Weight = .2

The main formulas used
Scale (1-3)
Weight =.2

Whether results are relative
or absolute.
Scale ( 1 or 2)
Weight = .2

3. Research Methods
3.1 Design Science
This research will utilize the design science research methodology, as an IT
artifact will be created. Hevner, et al. present the guidelines for design science research
in the paper “Design Science in Information Systems Research” for validation and
evaluation (Hevner, 2004). This research will employ each of the seven guidelines to
provide a methodical evaluation of the research IT artifact as outlined in table x
The artifacts shaped from this research include a RA model for SMFIs,
SMERAM, which has been tailored towards the financial sector. This model has been
created and evaluated with design research, using Hevner, et al’s. design science
approach (Hevner, 2004).
The seven guidelines outlined in the “Design Science in Information Systems
Research” are listed in Table 12. SMERAM has been developed in accordance with
Hevner, et al’s. guidelines and the SMERAM approach overview is also listed in Table
13.

Table 12 Hevner Design Science Guidelines

Guideline

Description

SMERAM

1- Design as an

Design-science research must

The artifact,

Artifact

produce a viable artifact in the

SMERAM, is created

form of a construct, a model, a

in accordance of
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method, or an instantiation

Hevener, et al. design
science guidelines

2- Problem

The objective of design-

SMERAM was

Relevance

science research is to develop

designed to address the

technology-based solutions to

staffing and financial

important, and relevant

limitations of SMFIs

business problems

all while meeting and
exceeding FDIC FIL
regulation

3- Design

The utility, quality, and

SMERAM was

Evaluation

efficacy of a design artifact

effectively tested and

must be rigorously

deployed in a

demonstrated via well-

community bank

executed evaluation methods
4- Research

Effective design-science

The SMERAM RA

Contributions

research must provide clear

model for SMFIs is the

and verifiable contributions in

contribution to the

the areas of the design artifact,

security and SMFI

design foundations, and/

fields
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design methodologies

5- Research

Design-science research relies

SMERAM was built

Rigor

upon the application of

on accepted generic

rigorous methods in both the

RA models such as

construction and evaluation of

ISO, NIST, COBIT,

the design artifact

and CORAS while
being honed to the
financial industry

6- Design as a

The search for an effective

SMERAM was

Search Process

artifact requires utilization

developed through a

available means to reach

prototype environment

desired ends while satisfying

after studying various

laws in the problem

established generic RA

environment

models

Design-science research must

SMERAM is designed

7-

Communication be presented effectively both
of Research

to technology-orientated as

to be used effectively
by both technical and

59

well as management-

non-technical

orientated audiences

personnel; the
intended audience is
bank management

Design as an Artifact
In guideline one, Design as an Artifact, research must produce a viable artifact in
the form of a construct, a model, a method, or an instantiation (Hevner, 2004). This
research will produce a RA model, SMERAM, that is tailored towards the small to
medium sized financial industry. SMERAM is intended for the use in small and medium
size entities.
SMERAM has been tested and evaluated with the management team in a SMEFI.
The SMFI was sought out due to their size and location and they agreed to allow the
researchers complete a no cost RA using the SMERAM model in exchange for
publishing data.
Problem Relevance
Guideline two, Problem Relevance, states that design-science research is to
develop technology-based solutions important and relevant to business problems
(Hevner, 2004). SMERAM does this by creating an RA model that addresses the FDIC
regulations and other federal mandates imposed on the financial industry.
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There are several generic IT RA models that organizations can adapt to protect
their information security. ISO, NIST, COBIT, CORAS and OCTAVE are included in
this research. However, none of these generic RA models are designed for the explicit
use in SMFIs. In fact, all of the generic models discussed fall short when it comes to the
unique needs of SMFIs which include financial limitations, staffing limitations, industry
configuration, along with a RA that evaluats security in terms of assets and
organizational security.
Most of these models are too large for SMFIs, as a result, SMFIs do not
adequately implement an entire generic standard, rather they employ various sections of
their chosen model, however not the entire standard. This makes benchmarking and
future assessments difficult to assess the continued evaluation in the RA process. In
addition to the extensive nature of the models, the generic models also usually require a
certified consultant or account to perform the RA, which is a cost SMFIs can’t afford. If
the generic model doesn’t require a certified consultant the IT department at the
organization needs to have knowledgeable staff to complete the RA, which usually isn’t
typical of a SMFI. The overall cost of these generic RA models is typically out of reach
of SMFIs.
None of the generic models are honed for the use in SMFIs. The financial
institution needs to be able to identify assets and threats along with identifying mitigating
approaches for reducing risk to the financial institution. This task, with no guidance, is
very difficult for SMFIs management team.
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Not all of the generic, industry accepted RA models are both asset and
organizational based models. Including both assets and the organization itself is
important to the overall security of an institution.
Design Evaluation
Guideline three, Design Evaluation, states that the utility, quality, and efficiency
of a design artifact must be rigorously demonstrated via well-executed evaluation
methods (Hevner, 2004).
SMERAM was tested via case study research with a volunteer financial institution
that is under $500 million in assets. A case study was conducted in Fall 2007 with the
financial institution’s management team. A year two follow up interview was conducted
in Fall 2008 to determine the effectiveness of the initial RA conducted in Fall 2007.
During the initial visit the financial institution was interviewed to determine
current RA practices. The financial institution stated they completed their yearly RA by
simply passing around an excel spreadsheet that listed all the bank’s assets, and then a
separate column stating what activities they deploy on their system to mitigate risk.
A review of the document showed a highly inaccurate RA practice at this
financial institution. The institution listed the following assets in their document:


Person X Office Computer (name withheld)



Person Y Office Computer (name withheld)



Person X Office Computer (name withheld)



Core Banking System
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FinCen



Deposit Platform



CU Serve Core System



Teller Computer 1



Teller Computer 2



Teller Computer 3



E mail



Printers

After reviewing the list, and taking a guided tour around the bank, the researchers
determined there were several assets that were not represented on their excel spreadsheet.
The missing assets are the following:


Checking Ordering Website



Credit Bureau Website



Email system



Firewall



Fund Transfer System



Internet Banking System



Internet Website Homepage



Router



Switch
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The assets that were overlooked by the financial institution were mostly assets
they outsourced such as their website, internet banking, E-mail system, and check
ordering site. Examples of assets they overlooked because they didn’t know they had
them were their router, firewall, and switch. Organization can outsource an aspect of
their business; however they cannot outsource their responsibility. If someone had
hacked into their internet banking site, and accessed their customers information their
customers would be looking at the financial institution for answers, not their 3rd party
service provider.
Overlooking these core assets is a very serious concern that SMFIs face when
they do not follow an appropriate RA model that is specific to their industry. RA’s need
to be completed by the management team, and they need a RA that is honed to their
industry, with specific assets, threats, and countermeasures.

Research Contribution
Guideline four, Research Contributions, state that each artifact must provide a
verifiable contribution to the area of the design artifact, which is in the areas of the design
artifact, design foundations, and/ design methodologies (Hevner, 2004).
The model proposed by the authors, SMERAM, contributes to both the
information technology security and SMFI fields. The information technology security
field is benefiting from a generic RA model that can be adapted to other fields, similar to
the fashion it was adapted to in SMFIs. The SMFI field is benefited from an RA model
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that is designed for their specific industry that is designed to aid in solving their unique
information security concerns.

Research Rigor
Guideline five, Research Rigor, stats design-science research relies upon the
application of rigorous methods in both the construction and evaluation of the design
artifact (Hevner, 2004). SMERAM was built on industry accepted generic RA models
such as ISO, NIST, COBIT, OCTAVE and CORAS while being honed to the financial
industry, with is demonstrated in Figure 8.

Industry Models
ISO

Regulation

NIST

FDIC FIL 68-99

Design Science

COBIT

FDIC FIL 81-05

Hevner el. al's 7 steps

CORAS

GLBA

OCTAVE

Figure 8 SMERAM Overview

Design as a Search Process

SMERAM
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Guideline six, Design as a Search Process, the search for an effective artifact
requires utilization available means to reach desired ends while satisfying laws in the
problem environment (Hevner, 2004). SMERAM was developed through a prototype
environment after studying various established generic RA models, such as ISO, NIST,
COBIT, OCTAVE, and CORAS. Many different versions of SMERAM were developed
and analyzed prior to the final version highlighted in this research.

Communication of Research
Guideline seven, Communication of Research, design science research must be
presented effectively both to technology-orientated as well as management-orientated
audiences (Hevner, 2004). SMERAM is designed to be used effectively by both technical
and non-technical personnel.
The intended audience of SMERAM is the bank management team. One of the
main concerns of SMFIs is the lack of technical personnel on staff, and SMERAM
effectively addresses this concern as it is designed to be used by non-technical
management staff. This research will be allow SMFIs to conduct their annual RA as
outlined by the FDIC, in a manner that produces a viable and value added RA.

3.2 Aspect of Generic Models used in SMERAM
The generic RA models NIST, ISO, COBIT, CORAS, and OCTAVE have many
quality attributes that make implementation into large and robust industries an
appropriate and efficient fit. However, these models are not an appropriate fit for smaller
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institutions due to financial and staffing limitations. There are steps within each model
that has been integrated into SMERAM as introduced in Table 14.
Table 13 Generic Models Integrated into SMERAM

Generic RA Model

Steps Integrated into SMERAM

NIST

System Characterization
Threat Identification
Control Analysis
Results Documentation

ISO

Organizational Security
Personnel Security

CORAS

Asset, Threat, Vulnerability

COBIT

Monitor and Evaluate

OCTAVE

Vulnerability Evaluation

4. SMERAM
4.1 Introducing SMERAM
Through the use of design science and following Hevner’s guidelines, a new RA
model has been developed specifically for the use in smaller financial institutions.
SMERAM works to provide a risk assessment model for small to medium sized financial
that address their unique needs in a way larger generic RA models do not.
The first unique need is staffing limitations. Smaller financial institutions
typically do not have the on-site technical staff. Larger generic RA models are not
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designed to be completed by management, and often require several onsite technical
employees.
The second unique need is financial limitations. Smaller financial institutions
typically do not have $50,000 or more to purchase the use of a generic RA model, which
is the cost for a medium sized organization to conduct an ISO RA model (Martin, 2002).
It is also important to note that the purchase price is an annual expense, not a onetime
expense. SMERAM, a free model, is designed to be completed by bank management.
The third unique need works with the first and second need. Most generic RA
models require not only a purchase price to use the model, but they also require certified
consultants to complete the risk assessment (Podhradsky, 2009). The certified consultant
is an addition expense on top of the cost of using the RA model.
The fourth unique need is addressing the information technology assets unique to
financial institutions (Podhradsky, 2009). SMERAM helps small and medium sized
financial institutions to complete a valid risk assessment that is both an adaptive and
integrated part of the entire information security program. SMERAM has predefined
assets, threats and countermeasures built into the RA model that are specific to the
financial industry.
The fifth unique need that smaller financial institutions have is that they need an
assessment that is both asset and organizational based (Streff, 2007). SMFIs need an all
encompassing assessment that helps the organization determine the security risk with
their IT assets along with the entire organization (Podhradsky, 2009).
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Figure 9, SMERAM, is the model that has been developed for the use in SMFIs.
The model addresses the six preceding unique needs of SMFIs.
SMERAM is designed to be completed in its entirety annually, and updated
whenever there is a major change in IT assets or networking infrastructure. The model is
designed to be conducted in a fashion where you progress to the next step after you
complete the preceding step. Meaning, if you do not successfully inventory and audit
assets and service providers in step one, step two will be incorrect and incomplete. The
same concept applies to all proceeding steps. After the organization finishes the final
step, they have successfully completed their annual RA with SMERAM. If there is any
purchases, or infrastructure updates in that year, the SMFI will updated their RA starting
with STEP one, finishing with step 7.
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1. Inventory &
Audit Assets

7. Apply
Organizational
Controls

2. Identify
Threats

SMERAM
6.
Demonstrate
Compliance

3.Calculate
Inherent Risk

5.Calculate
Residual Risk

Figure 9 SMERAM Risk Assessment Model

4. Apply
System
Controls
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4.1.1 Inventory & Audit Assets:
Step One, is modeled after both NIST and CORAS. In NIST, the step is called
System Characterization, and in CORAS is called Asset. In this step, the financial
institution works to determine the specific assets that are owned by the organization.
Vendors and service providers are also reviewed and listed because even though an
organization outsources some aspect of their business does not mean they are not
responsible for the security of the process.
The inclusion of 3rd party service providers and vendors is a new concept for RAs.
For example, if Bank of America’s core server suffered a data breach, and customer’s
personal information was stolen, they could not tell their shareholders, board of directors,
or customers that it wasn’t their fault because they outsourced their information security
with a Managed Security Service Provider (MSSP). The customer’s, shareholders, and
board of directors will look at Bank of America, and not the MSSP. As a result of the
data breach their credibility will be damaged. It is extremely important to note that you
can outsource your processes, but you cannot outsource your responsibility. Some other
accepted models fail to include vendors and service providers, which the researchers feel
is a serious oversight. There are certain levels of risk associated with certain service
providers.
The protection profile in SMERAM is similar with other notable RA models:
confidentiality, integrity, and availability. However, SMERAM also includes volume as
part of the overall protection profile. Volume is not factored as high as confidentiality,
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integrity or availability, but it is included when needed. The weight of each area is
calculated in terms of high, medium and low, with high being 3, medium being 2 and low
being represented by 1.
Confidentiality is defined as preserving authorized restrictions on information
access and disclosure, including means for protection personal privacy and proprietary
information (McCumber, 2005). Financial institutions have a responsibility to protect
their customer’s data from unauthorized access, they must make sure their information
systems are protected and secure.
Integrity is defined as guarding against improper information modification or
destruction and includes ensuing information non-repudiation and authenticity
(McCumber, 2005). The data that is inherent to a financial institution involves personal
identifying information that can be used to steal someone identity. This data needs to be
secure and accurate. Inaccurate financial data can lead have serious consequences on
someone’s financial history. In SMERAM, the weight for data integrity is rated in terms
of high, medium and low.
Availability is defined as ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of
information (McCumber, 2005). The financial institution and the customers need to
have near 24-7 access to the financial information. Customers need to know their
balances and account data, and financial institutions need to be able to access all records
to conduct their routine business.
Availability goes well beyond the scope of data into services and information
technology systems. A bank must have access to their core banking platform in order to
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conduct their business. Also, the connection to the FDIC must be secure and available
when it is needed. If a bank cannot transfer deposits to the FDIC, they will lose money
on their interest payments.
There is a predefined amount of acceptable downtime for all services and
information technology assets. Financial institutions need to be able to rate which assets
have to have the highest amount of uptime. In SMERAM, the weight for availability is
rated in terms of high, medium and low.
Volume is defined in relative terms. Volume is a new consideration in the
information technology security area, and it is integrated into SMERAM. Confidentiality,
integrity and availability have been constant and including volume is something the
researchers believe valid and necessary inclusion. For example, if a financial institution
has a two servers holding customer data, each that require high confidentiality, high
integrity, and need high availability, but one server has 1 file, and the other has over
1,000,000 files, volume will tell the financial institution more weight should be placed on
the server with more records. A data breach is serious regardless of where it occurs,
however, the researchers believe a data breach that effects millions of people versus one
that affects a few hundred has different considerations. In SMERAM, the weight for
volume is rated in terms of high, medium and low.
Appendix C lists all of the assets that are typical to financial institution. This
guideline helps to ensure that the financial institution doesn’t overlook any of their IT
assets or service providers, which will result in a more accurate RA.
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Figure 10 outlines the interface where the customers select the assets and service
providers that are typical to SMFIs. After this they progress to step 2, Identify Threats,
which is threats per each asset they outlined.

Figure 10 SMERAM Interface
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The financial institution ranks each of the assets and service providers in terms of
high, medium and low. After each asset is ranked, volume is included in the evaluation
in a means that is relative to the financial institution. The screen the SMFI sees on each
of the assets they outlined they have in their organization.
This step demonstrates how SMERAM is honed towards SMFIs. Some of the
assets are typical to any institution, but SMERAM also lays out all FDIC assets.

Figure 11 SMERAM: CIA-V

4.1.2 Identify Threats:
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The second step is modeled after NIST and CORAS. In NIST the step is Threat
Identification, and in CORAS the step is Threat. In this step of SMERAM, the financial
institution is assessing the threats inherent to each asset. Identifying threats is something
that most organizations tend to confuse with vulnerabilities; a definition of a threat is
“any circumstance with the potential to intentionally or unintentionally exploit a specific
vulnerability in an information system resulting in a loss of confidentiality, integrity or
availability (McCumber, 2005).”
A threat library is a valuable piece of literature for any organization, and that
holds true for financial information. Threat libraries determine what threats are specific to
specific assets. Financial institutions traditionally obtain a threat library in one of two
ways, they could spend the time to research threats and build out their own library, or
they could purchase a readymade library and apply the threats to their specific asses. In
the case of SMERAM, the threat library that is specific to banking assets is already
included with the RA model.
The financial institution determined the assets, service providers and venders in
step one, and in step two, SMERAM assigns the threats that are unique to the assets,
according to ISO (ISO 27002 Standard , 2005).

All assets that are predefined for the

financial industry are located in Appendix C. Tables 15, 16, 17 & 18 are examples of
banking assets and threats associated with those assets. The full threat library that is
associated with typical financial institution assets and 3rd party service providers is also
located in the appendix in Appendix F (ISO 27002 Standard , 2005).
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Table 14 Internet Banking System Threats

Internet Banking System
Data Leakage

Pharming

Phishing

Defacement

Intentional
Misuse

Unauthorized

Degraded /

Malicious

Remote Access

Unavailable

Software

Unauthorized

User Error

Environmental

Man-made /

Incident

Natural

Viewing

Outsourced

Unauthorized
Physical Access

Disaster

Table 15 Core Banking System Threats

Core Banking System
Data Loss

Unauthorized

Intentional

System Access

Misuse

Degraded /

Hardware

Unauthorized

Unavailable

Failure

Physical Access / Sniffing

Software

Unauthorized

Social

Software

Man-made /

Environmental

Viewing

Engineering

Acquisition

Natural

Incident

User Error

Outsourced

Unauthorized
Remote Access

Eavesdropping

Disaster

Malicious
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Table 16 Funds Transfer System Threats

Funds Transfer System
Unauthorized

Eavesdropping

Degraded /

Malicious

Unauthorized

System Access

/ Sniffing

Unavailable

Software

Viewing

Intentional

Unauthorized

User Error

Outsourced

Social

Misuse

Remote Access

Man-made /

Unauthorized

Natural

Physical Access

Engineering

Disaster

Table 17 Credit Bureau Website

Credit Bureau Website
User Error

Data Loss

Social

Defacement

Engineering
Unauthorized

Eavesdropping

Unauthorized

Viewing

/ Sniffing

System Access

Intentional
Misuse

Outsourced
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Table 18 Deposit Platform Threats

Deposit Platform
User Error

Data Loss

Social

Defacement

Engineering
Unauthorized

Eavesdropping

Unauthorized

Viewing

/ Sniffing

System Access

Intentional
Misuse

Outsourced

Software
Acquisition

Man-made /
Natural
Disaster

Figure 12 depicts a screen shot form SMERAM showing the threats associated
with a Core Banking System. In the next step, SMERAM shows the inherent level of
risk associated with each asset.
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Figure 12 SMERAM: Threats to Core Banking System

4.1.3 Calculate Inherent Risk:
Step three is modeled after the CORAS step Vulnerability. In this step,
Determining the Inherent Risk, the financial institution will be able to see which assets
represent the greatest risk to the bank. The inherent risk of each asset is the asset with no
security controls applied to mitigate risk (McCumber, 2005). For example, what would
be the risk of having a domain controller with absolutely no controls for security
enabled?
The current accepted industry standard uses the equation risk =asset*value*threat.
The researchers believe this formula is inherently flawed due to the consideration of the
monetary value. If you ask 10 different people to place a value on an asset, you will more
than likely get 10 different answers. Is it the purchase cost, the replacement cost, or the
depreciated cost? There is no standard for this issue.

80

The formula the researchers would like the audience to consider is risk =
confidentiality *integrity*availability, with the consideration of volume when CIA is
equal.
With the introduced scale of 1-3 for high, medium, and low; a high
confidentiality, high integrity, and high availability would equate to 3*3*3 times by a
volume decimal multiplier if confidentiality, integrity, and availability are equal.
If there are two servers equal in CIA, and Server A has 1,000 records, and Server
B has 1,000,000 records, and if both servers were compromised, Server B would result in
a higher loss for the institution. In this new approach of including volume, the servers
with higher volume should be protected more, as a breach could result in more harm,
when CIA is equal. Figure 12 shows the inherent risk level for a Core Banking System,
while Figure 13 shows the inherent risk a printer introduces to the organization. This
comparison allows the SMFI to have a visual depiction of the different inherent risk
levels of their assets and service providers.
The calculation that SMERAM employs to determine the inherent risk involves
analyzing the threats associated with the asset. Each threat is given a weight of high,
medium or low; whereas high equals 3, medium is 2, and low is 1. The assets are then
compared against each other, and ranked in sequential order. Figures 13 and 14 depict the
asset with the highest risk and the asset with the lowest inherent risk to the financial
institution.
This step is a demonstration of how SMERAM helps in the decision making
process at SMFIs, and is honed towards the financial sector.
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Figure 13 SMERAM: Inherent risks for Core Banking System
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Figure 14 SMERAM: Inherent risks for a Printer

4.1.4 Apply System Controls:
The next step is modeled after the NIST Controls phase. System controls are the
system safeguards the bank wants to implement to protect their information technology
assets. The system controls that are available for implementation are included with the
treat library, and are listed in Appendix F. The organization needs to determine what
controls they apply to their information systems to mitigate risk.
In this step, the financial institution keeps building on the previous steps of
inventory their assets and 3rd party service providers, indentifying steps, and determining
the inherent risk to the IT assets. During step 4, Apply System Controls, the SMFI
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reviews the predefined list of system safeguards that they currently deploy on their IT
assets.
This step allows the financial institution to determine what type of controls they
are currently applying and what type of controls are available to apply towards their IT
assets. This step is also crucial for developing a baseline in which all other RA’s can be
evaluated against.
Table 19 outlines the typical controls that are implemented in SMFIs, which is
also outlined in Appendix D (ISO 27002 Standard , 2005). Appendix E lists controls
mapped to assets (ISO 27002 Standard , 2005).
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Table 19 Controls Typical to Small and Medium Sized Financial Institutions

Controls Typical to SMFIs
Authorized
User
Restrictions

Access Logs

Formal TSP
Review

Formal TSP
Selection

Access Log
Monitoring

Invalid
Attempt
Lockout

Strong
Passwords

Unique User
Accounts

Encrypt Stored
Data

Formal
Patching
Process

Intrusion
Detection/
Prevention

Back-up
Critical Data

Change
Default
Security
Settings

Incident
Response
Program

Incident
Response
Program Test

Clear Screen
Awareness

Forced Session
Expiration

Maintenance
Logs

Multi-Factor
Authentication

System Access
Warning

Activity Logs

Change
Default
Account
Settings

Maintenance
Log Review

Temporarily
Disable Absent
Employee
Accounts

Vulnerability
Assessment:
Administrative
Privileges

Activity Log
Monitoring

Last
Successful
Logon

Business
Continuity
Plan Test

Network
Diagram

Test Back-up
Recovery

Formal TSP
Selection

Penetration
Testing

Social
Engineering
Security
Awareness

Spyware
Protection

Virus
Protection

Security
Cameras

Physical
Security
Awareness

Motion
Sensors

Restricted
Access Area

Formal
Patching
Process

Monitor
Placements

Dual Power
Supply

Firewall

Alert Reporting

Back-up
Critical Data
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Activity Log
Monitoring

Remove
Unnecessary
Software

Maintenance
Logs

Uninterruptible
Power Supply

Off-Site
Backup

Power
Conditioning

Disable /
Remove
Hardware

Dust Filtering

Humidity
Control

Temperature
Control

Locked Door

Biometrics

Content
Filtering

Disable
Terminated
Employee
Accounts

Inactive
Lockout

Business
Continuity
Plan

Vulnerability
Assessment

Off-Site
Backup

Formal TSP
Review

Monitored
Location

Network
Diagram

Line
Disconnect

Backup
Generator

Redundant
Systems

Figure 15 shows the screen the bank management uses to select the controls for
each of the assets they outlined in step 1. This screen is displayed for each asset they
own.
SMERAM assigns a ranking of high, medium, or low to each of the controls to
determine the impact they have on mitigating risk to the assets. Appendix D shows the
rating that has been applied to each control.
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Figure 15 SMERAM: System Controls for Core Banking System

4.1.5 Calculate Residual Risk:
The fifth step is modeled after OCTAVE’s Vulnerability step. In this step the
financial institution determines the residual risk that is associated with IT assets after the
controls are applied. The residual risk is the risk the asset imposes after having controls
applied to it. Ideally, the controls will reduce your assets risk. It is extremely important
to note that applying controls to IT assets does not completely eliminate the risk the asset
imposes to the institution. Risk can only be at an acceptable level, not a “zero” level.
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The financial institution has already inputted their assets and service providers, as
outlined in step 1. In step 2, they were given the threats that are associated with their
assets. Next, the financial institution outlined the controls they apply from the given
control list. Next, the system displays the residual risk associated with their information
technology assets. SMERAM calculates residual risk by determining the available
controls, and dividing the applied controls, by remaining, unapplied controls. Figure 16
depicts the residual risk calculation of a core banking system.
To calculate the residual risk SMERAM references the inherent risk value, which
is the initial value placed on the asset. The inherent risk, which is the treats associated
with the asset, has an equal amount of controls. Meaning, if there is 100 points of threats,
there is 100 points of available controls. SMERAM then analyzes the controls that are
actually implemented to mitigate risk. SMERAM then compares the initial value with no
controls implemented, and the value with controls implemented. The initial value, is then
compared to the implement controls value, to see what percentage of controls available
are being implements. For example, if the available controls have a total sum of 100
(high is 3, medium is 2, low is 1), and they are implementing a host of controls that total
80, the SMFI is implementing 80% of what is available. The final value on the High (3),
Medium (2), and Low (1) scale would be 2.42, which was calculated by taking .8 divided
by .33; .8 is the percentage of controls implemented, and .33 is used because of the scales
ratio.
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Figure 16 SMERAM: Residual Risk for Core Banking System

4.1.6 Preliminary Results and Reporting
The sixth step is modeled after both NIST and COBIT. The NIST step Results,
and the COBIT step Monitor and Evaluate are combined for this step. This step revolves
around reporting preliminary results of the RA and improving the process. In this step,
the organization learns if they are incompliance with the laws that govern the industry.
They also get a firsthand look at what they are currently doing and what they can do to
improve their security.
In terms of regulatory compliance, conducting an annual RA by the management
team earns the compliance approval.
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In this step the financial institution has a screen that is a combination to the screen
in the previous step. On the screen the institution views a particular asset, the current
controls implemented, and the progress bar which indicates their residual risk. The
financial institution can then select future controls they would like to implement to see
how their risk level for their asset will be reduced; this is demonstrated in Figure 15.
This is a demonstration of how SMERAM is helps in the decision making process. The
SMFI can use the results of their RA to determine how to spend their limited information
security budget.

Figure 17 SMERAM: Determine Compliance, Improve Security
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4.1.7 Apply Organizational Controls:
The final step, which is designed after ISOs Organizational Security step, allows
the financial organization determines safeguards the bank want to implement on an
organizational level, not system level as outlined in the previous steps above.
Organizational security allows the SMFI to determine what security practices should be
implemented to establish sound information security practices to support the entire
organization, opposed to just a single asset.
In the previous steps, the SMFI determined their asset based RA, in this step the
SMFI works to address the security for the entire organization.
A security awareness program would be an excellent example. Getting all
employees’ familiar with information security is a great way to make people feel
involved. There are different things you can do, such as posters, fliers, email reminders,
among other activities. As indicated in Figure 16, the SMFI can select an organizational
control, learn about what it is, and then determine if they currently or plan to employ the
control.
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Figure 18 SMERAM: Organizational Security & Controls
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5.0 Single Case Study, Anonymous SMFI
5.1 Case Study Research
For validation and evaluation of SMERAM a single case study was completed.
There are five rationales for selecting a single case study opposed to a multiple case study
(Yin, 2003):
1.

The first rationale for adopting a single case study is when the case
represents the critical case in evaluating and testing a well-formed theory.
The theory that is being evaluated needs to be clean with the propositions
and the circumstances within the propositions that are being perceived as
true. A single case study is used to confirm, challenge, or extend the
given theory. A single case study can be adopted to determine whether a
theory’s propositions are accurate or whether some alternative set of
explanations could prove to be more relevant.

2.

The second rationale for a single case study is when the study represents a
unique or extreme case. These two situations commonly occur in clinical
psychology, when a diagnosis is so rate, it would be important to
document all findings when analyzing the data.

3.

The third rationale for a single case study is when the single case is the
representative or typical case for the environment. The lessons learned
from this type of study have proved to be indicative of the lesions learned
had the case study been a multiple case study.
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4.

The fourth rationale for a single case study is when the study is considered
a revelatory case. This situation is used when a research has an
opportunity to observe a phenomenon that was previously inaccessible to
scientific investigations.

5.

The fifth rationale for implementing a single case study is longitudinal
studies. This situation is used when a study is compromised of two or
more points of time. For example you conduct your experiment one year,
and do a follow-up the next year.

A single case study was selected for testing SMERAM due to the third and fifth
rationales. First, the third rationale, because it indicates if a single case is the
representative or typical case for the environment then one single case study is sufficient.
The SMFI that was selected for deployment doesn’t have any impact of the outcome of
the research. Regardless of what SMFI was used, the results from deployment would
have been the same. Second, the firth rational is used because the study will be
conducted over two years. The first year will be the initial interview and risk assessment.
The second year will be compromised of a follow-up and interview.
One downfall of single case studies is that they might prove to be different from
the initial case design. As a result, single-case design requires very careful thought and
investigation of the potential case to minimize the occurrence of misrepresentation (Yin,
2003).
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The case study allowed the researchers to work close with the financial institution
to get a firsthand look at the strengths and weaknesses of SMERAM implemented in the
SMFI.

5.2 Single Case Study
The researchers piloted the generic SMERAM model to understand its strengths
and limitations in SMFIs. Specifically, the SMERAM risk assessment model was tested
through a case study in a SMFI in South Dakota. The SMFI was sought out by the
researchers to perform a voluntary RA in return for publishing data and testing purposes.
The SMFI met with the researchers on five separate occasions, four times in the fall of
2007 to complete the SMERAM RA process, and once again during the fall of 2008 to
hold a follow-up meeting. Table 20 introduces a step by step account for the four week
process during fall of 2007.

Table 20 SMERAM integration into Financial Institution- Overview

Week

What was done

Week 1

The first week involved determining all of the assets that
the credit union had. The SMFI had two of their
management employees working with the authors to
complete the RA. The two management employees were
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not technologically advanced employees. The SMFI
employees were given a list of the traditional assets that
banks have and had to determine which of the assets that
they had.

Week 2

The second week the researchers came bank onsite to
review the list of assets, vendors and services providers.
After the asset, vendor and service providers were
complete, the SMFI needed to determine, what controls
they currently apply to mitigate risk. The authors then
outlined the threats that applied to each asset which is
available from a predefined list. As demonstrated in
Figure 11.

Week 3

The third week involved reviewing the controls the SMFI
determined were in place, and determining residual risk.
Residual risk, as demonstrated in Figure 14 is the risk
associated with the asset after controls have been applied.
Next the SMFI can review how implementing further
controls can further reduce their security risk, as
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demonstrated in Figure 15.

Week 4

The fourth week, the SMFI reviewed the available
organizational controls that were available, and selected
whether they currently implement, or plan to implement
the control. If they do not implement a control, they
simply leave it blank; this is indicated in Figure 16. If the
SMFI is not certain what the specific control is, they click
on the controls button, and there is a description of what
the control is, and what it is useful.

5.1.1 Case Study Questionnaire
The case study questions were developed to determine current RA practices and
concerns, while also addressing the 5 research problems indicated in section 1.2. The
answers to these questions were used to help determine the effectiveness of implementing
SMERAM into a SMFI.
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1. What are your current risk assessment practices?
2. Are you following a defined model?
3. Who conducts the risk assessment?
4. How often do you complete your assessment?
5. Do you upgrade your assessment throughout the year?
6. What security concerns do you have with your organization?
7. What are you assets?
8. What threats are associated with your assets?
9. What controls do you apply to mitigate risk?
10. Do you feel you have a good handle on your information security?
11. What areas would you like to improve?
12. What type of annual budget do you have for information security?
13. How do you decide to spend your funds?
14. Do you outsource any of your information technology?
15. Are you concerned about your 3rd party service providers security?

Year One Answers: The answers were gathered through an interview during the fall of
2007, answers are paraphrased.
1. What are your current risk assessment practices?
We have an Excel spreadsheet that the management staff passes around and lists
our assets and the acts taken to secure them
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2. Are you following a defined model?
No
3. Who conducts the risk assessment?
Employee listed 2 personnel in the management team
4. How often do you complete your assessment?
Whenever we are about to be audited
5. Do you upgrade your assessment throughout the year?
No
6. What security concerns do you have with your organization?
None
7. What are you assets?
The SMFI listed person x computer, person y computer, teller computers, core
banking sever, check ordering computer, printer, payroll software, funds transfer
system, proof system and lending program
8. What threats are associated with your assets?
I’m not sure
9. What controls do you apply to mitigate risk?
Anti-Virus, user accounts and passwords
10. Do you feel you have a good handle on your information security?
Not really, I’m a loan specialists
11. What areas would you like to improve?
Not sure what needs to be improved
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12. What type of annual budget do you have for information security?
Very limited
13. How do you decide to spend your funds?
Whatever the board of directors says to improve, we improve
14. Do you outsource any of your information technology?
Website, online banking, ATM, credit card processing, and email
15. Are you concerned about your 3rd party service providers security?
No

Year Two Answers: The answers were gathered through an interview during the fall of
2008, answers are paraphrased.
1. What are your current risk assessment practices?
We follow the RA process that you introduced last year [SMERAM]
2. Are you following a defined model?
Yes [SMERAM]
3. Who conducts the risk assessment?
The bank employee listed 2 of the managers
4. How often do you complete your assessment?
Annually
5. Do you upgrade your assessment throughout the year?
Yes, we just had a new Proof System installed, and we updated our assets, and
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knew what controls were on the previous system, and what to implement on this
system
6. What security concerns do you have with your organization?
Increased security concerns with 3rd party service providers.
7. What are you assets?
The organization showed the researcher a list of assets from their RA- Researcher
reviewed and determined their work was highly accurate
8. What threats are associated with your assets?
The organization showed the researcher a list of threats associated with their
assets- Researcher reviewed and determined their work was highly accurate
9. What controls do you apply to mitigate risk?
The organization showed the researcher a list of controls associated with their
assets- Researcher reviewed and determined their work was highly accurate
10. Do you feel you have a good handle on your information security?
Yes, we feel that know we have a model to follow, and even though we don’t fully
understand the details of all the technology, we feel we can adequately protect
our assets
11. What areas would you like to improve?
More automation of the process
12. What type of annual budget do you have for information security?
Very minimal
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13. How do you decide to spend your funds?
The assets with the highest inherent and residual risk
14. Do you outsource any of your information technology?
Yes, quite a bit; website, online banking, card processing and ATM
15. Are you concerned about your 3rd party service providers security?
Yes, we have heard there have been a few breaches at different, service providers,
however, none of ours have been hit

To further evaluate the effectiveness of SMERAM, an evaluation matrix was
created to triangulate the model with the objectives of the research along with the case
study. Table 21 outlines the matrix and the research objectives. Each area of the matrix
was aided by the interview questions, which are listed after the matrix.
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Table 21 Evaluation Matrix

Evaluation Matrix
Resource
Effectiveness

Value added /
Decision Making

Organizational
Acceptance

Financial
Limitations
Interview

Staffing Limitations

Time Limitations

Interview

Interview

Measure
current
knowledge

Identify Areas of
Risk

Decision Making

Interview /
Observation

Assessment Results

Assessment Results

Appropriate of
Model Size

Organization
Awareness Lacking

Not part of
scoping

Interview/RA
Report

Interview

Interview

1. Resource Effectiveness: Financial Limitations
Questions Asked
 What type of annual budget do you have for information security?
 How do you decide to spend your funds?
 Do you outsource any of your information technology?


Year One Answers






Very limited
Whatever the BOD says to improve, we improve
Website, online banking, ATM, credit card processing, and email

Year Two Answers




Very minimal
The assets with the highest inherent and residual risk
Quite a bit; website, online banking, card processing, and email
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The second question asked, “How do you decided to spend your funds,” proved to
be very informative on how SMERAM helps SMFIs make decisions. In year one, the
SMFI relied on the board of directors to initiate the spending of IT dollars. In year two,
the SMFI used SMERAM to determine which assets impose the greatest amount of risk
to the institution, which is where they spent their IT dollars. This is one of the objectives
of this research.
2. Resource Effectiveness: Staffing Limitations
Questions Asked
 Who conducts the risk assessment?
 How often do you complete your assessment?
 Do you upgrade your assessment throughout the year?
 Do you outsource any of your information technology?


Year One Answers







Two Personnel
Whenever we are about to be audited
No
Website, online banking, ATM, credit card processing, and
email

Year Two Answers





Two members of the management team
Annually
Yes, whenever there is a major change to the organization
Quite a bit; website, online banking, card processing, and
email

The second question, “How often do you complete your assessment,”
demonstrated that SMERAM is effective in bringing the institution into compliance with
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the regulation that governs their industry. In year one, the SMFI only complete the RA
when they were about to be audited; which is every 18 months. With SMERAM the
SMFI conducted the RA annually, which bring the institution from out of compliance to
in compliance. This is one of the objectives of this research.
3. Resource Effectiveness: Time Limitations
Questions Asked

What are your current risk assessment practices?

Are you following a defined model?

How often do you complete your assessment?

Do you upgrade your assessment throughout the year?


Year One Answers








Excel Spreadsheet
No
Whenever we are about to get audited
No
Website, online banking, ATM, credit card processing, and
email

Year Two Answers






Model introduced last year; SMEREAM
Yes, SMERAM
Annually
Yes, whenever there is a change: New proof system
Quite a bit; website, online banking, card processing, and email

The first question asks the SMFI, “What are your current risk assessment
practices,” this question showed the researchers that the SMFI went from not gaining any
value from their RA to a RA that is value added to the SMFI.
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4. Value Added/ Decision Making: Measure Current Knowledge
Questions Asked

What security concerns do you have with your organization?

What are you assets?

What threats are associated with your assets?


Year One Answers






None
SMFI listed Person Xs computer, Person Ys computer, teller
computers, core banking server, check ordering computer,
printer, payroll software, funds transfer system, proof system
and lending program
I’m not sure

Year Two Answers





Increased security concerns with TSP
The organization showed the researcher a list of assets that
were found with their use of SMERAM, this was checked by
the researchers and proved to be correct
The organization showed the researchers a list of threats
associated with their assets form SMERAM

The three questions demonstrate that the SMFI went from merely appeasing
regulators to conducting a RA that adds values to the institution. This is one of the
objectives of the research.

5. Value Added/ Decision Making: Identify Areas of Risk
Questions Asked

What controls do you apply to mitigate risk?

Do you feel you have a good handle on your information security?

What areas would you like to improve?

Are you concerned about your 3rd party service providers security?
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Year One Answers







Anti-Virus, ser accounts and passwords
Not really, I’m a loan specialists
Not sure what needs to be improved
No

Year Two Answers







The organization showed the researchers a list of controls
associated with their assets. The researchers reviewed the list,
and it proved to be accurate
Yes, we feel we know we have a model to follow, and even
though we don’t fully understand the details, we feel we can
adequately protect our assets
More automation of the process
Yes, we have heard there have been a few breaches at different
service providers, however none of ours have been
compromised.

The second question asks the SMFI, “Do you feel you have a good handle on
your information security ,” this question showed the researchers that the SMFI went
from not feeling they couldn’t conduct a value added RA to feeling they could conduct a
reliable RA for the institution.
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7. Value Added/ Decision Making: Decision Making
Questions Asked
 Do you upgrade your assessment throughout the year?
 What security concerns do you have with your organization?
 What areas would you like to improve?


Year One Answers






No
None
Note sure what needs to be improved

Year Two Answers




Yes, whenever there is a major change
Increase security concerns with TSP
More automation

The second question asked the institution, “What security concerns do you have
with your organization.” In year one, the SMFI did have any concerns, in year two the
SMFI was aware of security concerns with TSP, and that was their focus.

8. Organizational Acceptance: Appropriateness of Model Size
Questions Asked
 What are your current risk assessment practices?

Are you following a defined model?

Do you feel you have a good handle on your information security?

What areas would you like to improve?


Year One Answers



Excel spreadsheet passed around
No
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Not really, I’m a loan specialist
Not sure what needs to be improved

Year Two Answers






We follow the RA process introduced last year
Yes, SMERAM
Yes, we feel that know we have a model to follow, and
even though we don’t fully understand the details of all the
technology, we feel we can adequately protect our assets
More automation

8. Organizational Acceptance: Organization Awareness Lacking
Questions Asked
 What security concerns do you have with your organization?

Do you feel you have a good handle on your information security?

What areas would you like to improve?
 Are you concerned about your 3rd party service providers security?


Year One Answers







None
Not really, I’m a loan specialist
Not sure what needs to be improved
No

Year Two Answers





Increased concerns with TSP
Yes, we feel that know we have a model to follow, and
even though we don’t fully understand the details of all the
technology, we feel we can adequately protect our assets
More Automation
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Yes, we have heard there have been a few breaches at
different service providers, however non of ours have been
hit

9. Organizational Acceptance: Not part of scoping
Questions Asked
 What are your current risk assessment practices?
 Are you following a defined model?
 Who conducts the risk assessment?


Year One Answers






Excel Spreadsheet passed around management
No
2 personnel

Year Two Answers




RA model introduced last year, SMERAM
Yes
2 members of the management team

The overall message the researchers received from the two interviewers is that the
information security posture at the SMFI increased from year one to year two. The SMFI
stated that while they are still unsure of their abilities to handle information technology
on the technical side, they believe they can manage the security of the systems.
The SMFIs managers stated that they feel they have a better grasp on their assets
and countermeasures needed to protect the organization and their customer’s personal
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data. The SMFI also was using the data provided by SMERAM to decide how to spend
their information security budget.
The interview process helped the researches identify whether or not SMERAM
helped the SMFI handle the core objectives of this research, which was financial
limitations, staffing limitations, aid in the decision making process, all while being honed
to the financial sector.
The overall message the researchers received from the anonymous SMFI is that
they were surprised how easy the RA process could be, along with the added value it
gave to their institution. The two management employees indicated were impressed with
their ability to conduct a viable RA involving their information technology, given their
nontechnical background.
The SMFI found that determining their assets and service providers was easier
than expected, and when compared to previous RA’s they found they had more assets
than they were reporting before. This means, they were not only under reporting their
assets, they were giving zero consideration to their unreported assets security. This
incident is a serious concern.

5.2.1 Step One: Inventory and Audit Assets
In this step, the financial institution outlined having the following assets. The
assets with an “*” indicate the asset management has been outsourced.
1- Deposit Platform*
2- FinCen
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3- Advantage ATM*
4- Anti-Virus Software
5- Check Ordering Website*
6- Credit Bureau Website*
7- CU Serve Core System*
8- Desktop Computers
9- E-Mail*
10- Firewall*
11- Funds Transfer System*
12- Internet Banking System*
13- Printers
14- Router
15- Switch
Table 22, outlines typical assets that are located in SMFIs, the SMFI had some of
the assets as indicated in the list above, but not all of the assets.
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Table 22- Common SMFI Assets & Service Providers

Common SMFI Assets and Service Providers
Internet Banking
System

Core Banking
system

Fund Transfer
System

Credit Bureau
Website

Deposit
Platform

Printers

Notebook
Computers

Desktop
Computers

Firewall

Lending
Program

Marketing
Software

Payday Lending

Payroll
Software

PDA’s

Router

Switch

Firewall

Smart Phones

Terminal
Services

Web Server

Email Server

Accounting
Software

Background
Checking
Website

Anti-Virus
Software

ATM

Call Reporting
Software

HMDA

Operating
Systems

Intrusion
Detection
System

File Server

Item Imaging

Local Area
Network

Merchant
Card
Processing
System
Check
Ordering
Website

VoIP

Deb/Credit
Cards

Bank Website

Application
Server

Remote
Capture
Systems

Storage Area
Network

Wide Area
Network

Proof System

Check
Reader /
Sorter
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5.2.2 Step Two: Identify Threats
In this step, the financial institution has already selected their assets and
SMERAM determines their corresponding threats. Considering that SMERAM is honed
to the SMFI industry, the financial institution did not have to research the threats
associated with the asset as it is already pre-defined. The threats associated with typical
SMFI assets include environment threats, natural threats, and human threats.
Environment threats include long-term power failure, liquid damage, chemical
damage, among others. Natural threats include floods, tornadoes, earthquakes, electrical
storms, among others. Human threats include intentional and unintentional acts such as
viruses, Trojans and data deletion, and unauthorized access among others.

5.2.3 Step Three: Determine Inherent Risk

The inherent risk is viewed by the financial institution after the assets and threats
that are associated with their assets are determined, as indicated in Figure 12 in section
4.1.3. The SMFI views the risk associated with each of their assets with no controls
applied. This helps visually demonstrate the importance of controls and mitigating
activities. The SMFI can visually determine which assets introduce more risk to the
organization. This also gives the SMFI the opportunity to determine which assets needed
the greatest protection. In the anonymous SMFI, they found that the assets they outlined
introduced risk into the organization in the following order.
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1- Core Banking System
2- Deposit Platform*
3- Funds Transfer System*
4- Internet Banking System*
5- FinCen
6- Advantage ATM*
7- Check Ordering Website*
8- Credit Bureau Website*
9- Anti-Virus Software
10- Desktop Computers
11- Firewall*
12- E-Mail*
13- Router
14- Switch
15- Printers

5.2.4 Step Four: Identify Controls

In this step, the SMFI reviewed the controls that are specific to their assets they
outlined in step one. Figure 13 outlines a single asset, the Core Banking System, and the
controls available to implement on that system. The SMFI see’s a screen similar to Figure
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13 for each of the assets they outlined in Figure 11 in section 4.1.3. The SMFI has to go
through this process for each of the assets they own.
Common controls found in SMFIs are listed in Table 22, Common Controls; this
list is not asset specific rather in general terms. A list of assets associated with controls
can be found in Appendix D.
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Table 23 Common Controls

Common Controls Applied to Assets
Authorized
User
Restrictions

Access Logs

Formal TSP
Review

Formal TSP
Selection

Access Log
Monitoring

Invalid
Attempt
Lockout

Strong
Passwords

Unique User
Accounts

Encrypt Stored
Data

Formal
Patching
Process

Intrusion
Detection/
Prevention

Back-up
Critical Data

Change
Default
Security
Settings

Incident
Response
Program

Incident
Response
Program Test

Clear Screen
Awareness

Forced Session
Expiration

Maintenance
Logs

Multi-Factor
Authentication

System Access
Warning

Activity Logs

Change
Default
Account
Settings

Maintenance
Log Review

Temporarily
Disable Absent
Employee
Accounts

Vulnerability
Assessment:
Administrative
Privileges

Activity Log
Monitoring

Last
Successful
Logon

Business
Continuity
Plan Test

Network
Diagram

Test Back-up
Recovery

Formal TSP
Selection

Penetration
Testing

Social
Engineering
Security
Awareness

Spyware
Protection

Virus
Protection

Security
Cameras

Physical
Security
Awareness

Motion
Sensors

Restricted
Access Area

Formal
Patching
Process

Monitor
Placements

Dual Power
Supply

Firewall

Alert Reporting

Back-up
Critical Data
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Activity Log
Monitoring

Remove
Unnecessary
Software

Maintenance
Logs

Uninterruptible
Power Supply

Off-Site
Backup

Power
Conditioning

Disable /
Remove
Hardware

Dust Filtering

Humidity
Control

Temperature
Control

Locked Door

Biometrics

Content
Filtering

Disable
Terminated
Employee
Accounts

Inactive
Lockout

Business
Continuity
Plan

Vulnerability
Assessment

Off-Site
Backup

Formal TSP
Review

Monitored
Location

Network
Diagram

Line
Disconnect

Backup
Generator

Redundant
Systems

5.2.5 Step Five Residual Risk
In this step, the SMFI built on their previous four steps to determine what the
residual risk is for their institution technology assets. The SMFI can see what residual
risk is left after they apply their controls. In this specific SMFI, they were able to see that
they have been doing a good job protecting their assets, however, they could do more to
protect their router, switch, desktop computers, and core banking system. The order of
volatility, which indicates the assets that have the highest need for further protection for
the anonymous SMFI, is listed below.
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1- Router
2- Switch
3- Desktop Computers
4- Core Banking System
5- Deposit Platform
6- Firewall
7- FinCen
8- Advantage ATM
9- Anti-Virus Software
10- Check Ordering Website
11- Credit Bureau Website
12- E-Mail
13- Funds Transfer System
14- Internet Banking System
15- Printers
This part of the RA process allows the SMFI to see what order they should
consider applying future controls to protect their information systems. This helps the
SMFI determine where they should apply their IT security budget.
Further, the SMFI viewed what more controls would mean to their overall
security. This step naturally leads to step six, Demonstrate Compliance.
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5.2.6 Step Six Demonstrate Compliance
By this step, the SMFI has viewed their assets, threats, controls, and residual risk,
and they can see if they are at an adequate protection level for their governing board,
which is the FDIC. FDIC mandates an annual RA conducted by the management team, if
the RA is at this step in the process they are indeed in compliance.
In this specific case study, the SMFI found that their actions were acceptable to
their industry. However, they saw improvements that could be made to their institution
that would further protect their institution. The main improvements, as indicated by
SMERAM, should be on the router, switch, desktops and core banking system. The
SMFI also determine that future controls for each of those assets should include an
Incidence Response Program, UPS, Physical Security Awareness, Penetration Testing,
and Log File Reviews. These controls, some of which don’t have a monetary price tag,
would significantly improve their assets security.

5.2.7 Step Seven Apply Organizational Controls
In the final step, the SMFI looked at available organization security controls that
they could implement. Admittedly, the SMFI stated they didn’t do much in terms of
organization security awareness. The SMFI reviewed available security controls available
at the organizational level. Examples include security awareness posters, emails, and
informational sessions.
For this specific SMFI, they determined implementing monthly security
awareness emails, and a security awareness program was a great way to start increasing
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the overall security level of the financial institution.

5.4 Year Two Follow Up Meeting (Fall 2008)
The year two follow up meeting, which was held during the Fall of 2008, gave the
researchers the ability to see the model integrated into the SMFI over the course of the
year. The researchers were focused on seeing how the SMFI felt SMERAM helped them
address their information security needs, while also being user friendly to the
management team conducting the RA.
The management team stated they were successful in getting most of their
proposal approved by the board of directors; which included the Incidence Response
Program, Physical Security Awareness, and UPS’s. The management team further stated
that they will continue conducting RA’s and will use the initial RA as a baseline to view
how their IT security is improving.
The management team continued to state they updated their RA during the year
and could see a graphical depiction of how their information security improved over the
course of the year in SMERAM. For example, the SMFI could see how conducting a
vulnerability assessment, and moving backups offsite increased their security level on
their assets. The management team also stated that within the month, they would begin
their year two RA.
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6.0 Conclusion
6.1 Conclusion
Financial Institutions by nature house data that is susceptible to attacks and other
malicious actions. The data that is housed in financial institutions can result in identity
theft if compromised by a data breach. Due to the inherent risks associated with the
financial industry there are regulation requirements that are specific to the financial
industry.
Financial institutions, of all sizes, are required to conduct a risk assessment (RA)
every year by the FDIC. Large financial institutions, which are typically billions in
financial assets, have different abilities and needs compared to smaller financial
institutions which are typically millions in financial assets. However, according to the
FDIC, both institution sizes have the same regulations and requirements for risk
management. Large and small financial institutions have the same FDIC regulation but
different resources available in terms of IT staffing, IT budgets, and overall security
needs yet overall the FDIC regulations are written in a one-size-fits-all environment.
Small and Medium Sized Financial Institutions (SMFIs) understand they are
required by the FDIC to conduct a RA, and they typically approach this process in a
manner to appease regulators. The RA process that SMFIs take does not typically result
in an accurate RA or add value to their organization (Streff, 2007). RA’s for SMFIs need
to identify assets and service providers, outline the risk with each asset, list the
countermeasures applied to each asset and demonstrate how effective their current
mitigating approach is in reducing the risk to the financial institution (Podhradsky, 2009).
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However, a majority of SMFIs handle the RA process in a completely different fashion
where bankers pass around an excel spreadsheet and various people throughout the bank
list assets and the approach taken to secure the device (Streff, 2007). This process not
only results in a grossly inaccurate RA, but it also adds no value to the organization.
When organizations conduct RA’s in this manner, they are only completing this
assessment to conciliate government FDIC regulation, and not using it as a tool for their
overall risk management process (Streff, 2007).
Generic RA models have been developed and deployed across several industries,
including banking; however generic RA models assume a high level of understanding
about banking assets, risks, threats, risk mitigation, and information security policy which
is typically found in larger financial institutions. This type of advanced knowledge is
usually not found in management (Gautam, 1989). SMFIs need a different approach to
solving their information security RA process than their larger financial institutions
counterparts. The generic models implemented by larger financial institutions are not
applicable to smaller institutions, due to their IT staffing, IT budget, and IT security
limitations. A RA model for a SMFI should also include both an asset and organizational
assessment (Streff, 2007). Larger financial organizations have the financial and staffing
resources to conduct both an asset and organizational based assessment, however SMFIs
need to incorporate both assessments into one single assessment (Streff, 2007).
The generic model, SMERAM, which is honed for the specific use in small and
medium sized financial institutions, was developed after studying the generic risk
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assessment models ISO, NIST, OCTAVE, COBIT and CORAS. SMERAM was built on
these specific generic RA models.
SMFIs have unique needs that are not adequately addressed with most generic RA
models. An RA model for SMFIs needs to address FDIC regulations, IT staffing
limitations, financial resource restrictions, all while being tailored towards the banking
industry. SMERAM works to address the unique needs of SMFIs.
SMERAM meets FDIC FIL guidelines as it is designed for the RA to be
completed every year, and reviewed on an ongoing basis. Furthermore, SMERAM also
encourages SMFIs to update their RA whenever there is a major change in their network
or information technology infrastructure, which keeps the RA an adaptive and living part
of the information security program. This approach adds value to the organization as it
helps the financial institution identify and outline their current security posture and
allows them make informed decisions regarding their information technology purchases
and upgrades.
IT staffing limitations are met with SMERAM as financial institutions do not
need a dedicated IT department or staff member on-site to complete the RA. Risk
management is a management responsibility and a member of the management team can
conduct the RA (Streff, 2007). SMERAM has been specifically created to be completed
by both technical and non-technical personnel. Other Generic RA models require a
certified consultant or full time IT staff to complete the RA, while SMERAM does not.
This unique characteristic of SMERAM reduces the cost of implementation and
maintenance which is not typically seen in other generic RA models.
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The smaller IT budgets associated with SMFIs are also factored into SMERAM.
Most generic RA models such as ISO, NIST, or COBIT require a certified consultant or
IT staff to complete the RA, while SMERAM does not, which results in reduced costs for
completing a valid and value added RA. Also, SMERAM does not have any subscription
costs associated with its implementation, which is unlike other generic RA models.
SMERAM further adds value to the financial institution as it completes both an
asset and organizational RA. Not all generic RA models evaluate security in both an
asset and organizational level as SMERAM does. This approach saves time and money
for SMFIs as only one RA has to be completed.

6. 2 Future Work
The researchers theorize that one way to overcome such diversity and complexity
of RA’s is to create cohorts of similar businesses. The creation of these “risk assessment
realms” will allow for the application and development of tighter standards which can
then be applied to each realm. This will also help to overcome the immense diversity
among businesses, organizations, and industries, and allow for a relative comparison of
threats, probabilities, impacts, and assets to similar organizations. A key value to creating
risk realms based on organization size, industry type, or business unit would be the
creation of accurate, comparable risk assessments to other organizations in the same
realm. Data mining for historical purposes and future trends would then be possible.
The goal of future research would be to identify key “realms” and related fields,
then provide a common framework for accurately and consistently measuring risk for the

125

identified realms. The author proposes defining systems and risks as associated with a
particular industry for the creation of these realms. While many of the pre-defined threats
and their corresponding impacts, probability and volume will apply across several
industries, the author feels it is important to compile these lists individually.
Upon completion of identifying a particular realm, the author feels there is need
for future research and the creation of a “risk assessment artifact”. This would allow for
the uniform, standardized risk assessment process which is specifically aimed at
particular cohort. The researchers also feel that by introducing network discovery
protocols integrating SMERAM into these other realms.

6.3 Limitations of SMEREAM
SMERAM has known limitations, which includes implementation outside of the
financial sector. SMERAM, has been tailored towards specific implementation in
SMFI’s, and in its current form, it isn’t appropriate for implementation outside of the
financial sector.
SMEREAM was also tested in a single SMFI, according to Yin a single case
study is sufficient, and there was only one full implementation of the model.
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Appendix A:
FDIC FIL 68-99
Risk Assessment Tools and Practices
for Information System Security
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to provide financial institutions and examiners with background
information and guidance on various risk assessment tools and practices related to information
security. Institutions using the Internet or other computer networks are exposed to various
categories of risk that could result in the possibility of financial loss and reputational harm.
Given the rapid growth of the Internet and networking technology, the available risk
assessment tools and practices are becoming more important for information security.
This paper provides a summary of critical points, discusses components of a sound
information security program, and describes the risk assessment and risk management
processes for information security. The appendix provides specific information on certain risk
assessment tools and practices that may be part of an institution's information security
program. The paper and appendix are intended to provide useful information and guidance,
not to create new examination standards, impose new regulatory requirements, or represent an
exclusive description of the various ways financial institutions can implement effective
information security programs.
Whether financial institutions contract with third-party providers1 for computer services such
as Internet banking, or maintain computer services in-house, bank management is responsible
for ensuring that systems and data are protected against risks associated with emerging
technologies and computer networks. If a bank is relying on a third-party provider,
management must generally understand the provider's information security program to
effectively evaluate the security system's ability to protect bank and customer data.
The FDIC has previously issued guidance on information security concerns such as data
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privacy and confidentiality, data integrity, authentication, non-repudiation, and access
control/system design. This paper is designed to supplement Financial Institution Letter 13197, "Security Risks Associated With the Internet," dated December 18, 1997, and to
complement the FDIC's safety and soundness electronic banking examination procedures.
Related guidance can be found in the FFIEC Information Systems Examination Handbook.
SUMMARY OF CRITICAL POINTS
To ensure the security of information systems and data, financial institutions should have a
sound information security program that identifies, measures, monitors, and manages potential
risk exposure. Fundamental to an effective information security program is ongoing risk
assessment of threats and vulnerabilities surrounding networked and/or Internet systems.
Institutions should consider the various measures available to support and enhance
information security programs. The appendix to this paper describes certain vulnerability
assessment tools and intrusion detection methods that can be useful in preventing and
identifying attempted external break-ins or internal misuse of information systems. Institutions
should also consider plans for responding to an information security incident.
INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM
A financial institution's board of directors and senior management should be aware of
information security issues and be involved in developing an appropriate information security
program. A comprehensive information security policy should outline a proactive and ongoing
program incorporating three components:




Prevention
Detection
Response

Prevention measures include sound security policies, well-designed system architecture,
properly configured firewalls, and strong authentication programs. This paper discusses two
additional prevention measures: vulnerability assessment tools and penetration analyses.
Vulnerability assessment tools generally involve running scans on a system to proactively
detect known vulnerabilities such as security flaws and bugs in software and hardware. These
tools can also detect holes allowing unauthorized access to a network, or insiders to misuse the
system. Penetration analysis involves an independent party (internal or external) testing an
institution's information system security to identify (and possibly exploit) vulnerabilities in the
system and surrounding processes. Using vulnerability assessment tools and performing
regular penetration analyses will assist an institution in determining what security weaknesses
exist in its information systems.
Detection measures involve analyzing available information to determine if an information

131

system has been compromised, misused, or accessed by unauthorized individuals. Detection
measures may be enhanced by the use of intrusion detection systems (IDSs) that act as a
burglar alarm, alerting the bank or service provider to potential external break-ins or internal
misuse of the system(s) being monitored.
Another key area involves preparing a response program to handle suspected intrusions and
system misuse once they are detected. Institutions should have an effective incident response
program outlined in a security policy that prioritizes incidents, discusses appropriate responses
to incidents, and establishes reporting requirements.
The appendix provides a detailed discussion on prevention (vulnerability assessment tools and
penetration analyses), detection (IDS tools), and response measures. Before implementing
some or all of these measures, an institution should perform an information security risk
assessment. Depending on the risk assessment, certain risk assessment tools and practices
discussed in this paper may be appropriate. However, use of these measures should not result
in decreased emphasis on information security or the need for human expertise.
RISK ASSESSMENT/MANAGEMENT
A thorough and proactive risk assessment is the first step in establishing a sound security
program. This is the ongoing process of evaluating threats and vulnerabilities, and establishing
an appropriate risk management program to mitigate potential monetary losses and harm to an
institution's reputation. Threats have the potential to harm an institution, while vulnerabilities
are weaknesses that can be exploited.
The extent of the information security program should be commensurate with the degree of
risk associated with the institution's systems, networks, and information assets. For example,
compared to an information-only Web site, institutions offering transactional Internet banking
activities are exposed to greater risks. Further, real-time funds transfers generally pose greater
risks than delayed or batch-processed transactions because the items are processed
immediately. The extent to which an institution contracts with third-party vendors will also
affect the nature of the risk assessment program.
Performing the Risk Assessment and Determining Vulnerabilities
Performing a sound risk assessment is critical to establishing an effective information security
program. The risk assessment provides a framework for establishing policy guidelines and
identifying the risk assessment tools and practices that may be appropriate for an institution.
Banks still should have a written information security policy, sound security policy guidelines,
and well-designed system architecture, as well as provide for physical security, employee
education, and testing, as part of an effective program.
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When institutions contract with third-party providers for information system services, they
should have a sound oversight program. At a minimum, the security-related clauses of a
written contract should define the responsibilities of both parties with respect to data
confidentiality, system security, and notification procedures in the event of data or system
compromise. The institution needs to conduct a sufficient analysis of the provider's security
program, including how the provider uses available risk assessment tools and practices.
Institutions also should obtain copies of independent penetration tests run against the
provider's system.
When assessing information security products, management should be aware that many
products offer a combination of risk assessment features, and can cover single or multiple
operating systems. Several organizations provide independent assessments and certifications
of the adequacy of computer security products (e.g., firewalls). While the underlying product
may be certified, banks should realize that the manner in which the products are configured
and ultimately used is an integral part of the products' effectiveness. If relying on the
certification, banks should understand the certification process used by the organization
certifying the security product. Other examples of items to consider in the risk assessment
process include:








Identifying mission-critical information systems, and determining the effectiveness of
current information security programs. For example, a vulnerability might involve
critical systems that are not reasonably isolated from the Internet and external access
via modem. Having up-to-date inventory listings of hardware and software, as well as
system topologies, is important in this process.
Assessing the importance and sensitivity of information, and the likelihood of outside
break-ins (e.g., by hackers) and insider misuse of information. For example, if a large
depositor list were made public, that disclosure could expose the bank to reputational
risk and the potential loss of deposits. Further, the institution could be harmed if
human resource data (e.g., salaries and personnel FILes) were made public. The
assessment should identify systems that allow the transfer of funds, other assets, or
sensitive data/confidential information, and review the appropriateness of access
controls and other security policy settings.
Assessing the risks posed by electronic connections with business partners. The other
entity may have poor access controls that could potentially lead to an indirect
compromise of the bank's system. Another example involves vendors that may be
allowed to access the bank's system without proper security safeguards, such as
firewalls. This could result in open access to critical information that the vendor may
have "no need to know."
Determining legal implications and contingent liability concerns associated with any of
the above. For example, if hackers successfully access a bank's system and use it to
subsequently attack others, the bank may be liable for damages incurred by the party

133

that is attacked.
Potential Threats To Consider
Serious hackers, interested computer novices, dishonest vendors or competitors, disgruntled
current or former employees, organized crime, or even agents of espionage pose a potential
threat to an institution's computer security. The Internet provides a wealth of information to
banks and hackers alike on known security flaws in hardware and software. Using almost any
search engine, average Internet users can quickly find information describing how to break
into various systems by exploiting known security flaws and software bugs. Hackers also may
breach security by misusing vulnerability assessment tools to probe network systems, then
exploiting any identified weaknesses to gain unauthorized access to a system. Internal misuse
of information systems remains an ever-present security threat.
Many break-ins or insider misuses of information occur due to poor security programs.
Hackers often exploit well-known weaknesses and security defects in operating systems that
have not been appropriately addressed by the institution. Inadequate maintenance and
improper system design may also allow hackers to exploit a security system. New security
risks arise from evolving attack methods or newly detected holes and bugs in existing software
and hardware. Also, new risks may be introduced as systems are altered or upgraded, or
through the improper setup of available security-related tools. An institution needs to stay
abreast of new security threats and vulnerabilities. It is equally important to keep up to date on
the latest security patches and version upgrades that are available to fix security flaws and
bugs. Information security and relevant vendor Web sites contain much of this information.
Systems can be vulnerable to a variety of threats, including the misuse or theft of passwords.
Hackers may use password cracking programs to figure out poorly selected passwords. The
passwords may then be used to access other parts of the system. By monitoring network
traffic, unauthorized users can easily steal unencrypted passwords. The theft of passwords is
more difficult if they are encrypted. Employees or hackers may also attempt to compromise
system administrator access (root access), tamper with critical FILes, read confidential e-mail,
or initiate unauthorized e-mails or transactions.
Hackers may use "social engineering," a scheme using social techniques to obtain technical
information required to access a system. A hacker may claim to be someone authorized to
access the system such as an employee or a certain vendor or contractor. The hacker may then
attempt to get a real employee to reveal user names or passwords, or even set up new
computer accounts. Another threat involves the practice of "war dialing," in which hackers use
a program that automatically dials telephone numbers and searches for modem lines that
bypass network firewalls and other security measures. A few other common forms of system
attack include:
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Denial of service (system failure), which is any action preventing a system from
operating as intended. It may be the unauthorized destruction, modification, or delay of
service. For example, in a "SYN Flood" attack, a system can be flooded with requests
to establish a connection, leaving the system with more open connections than it can
support. Then, legitimate users of the system being attacked are not allowed to connect
until the open connections are closed or can time out.
Internet Protocol (IP) spoofing, which allows an intruder via the Internet to effectively
impersonate a local system's IP address in an attempt to gain access to that system. If
other local systems perform session authentication based on a connection's IP address,
those systems may misinterpret incoming connections from the intruder as originating
from a local trusted host and not require a password.
Trojan horses, which are programs that contain additional (hidden) functions that
usually allow malicious or unintended activities. A Trojan horse program generally
performs unintended functions that may include replacing programs, or collecting,
falsifying, or destroying data. Trojan horses can be attached to e-mails and may create
a "back door" that allows unrestricted access to a system. The programs may
automatically exclude logging and other information that would allow the intruder to
be traced.
Viruses, which are computer programs that may be embedded in other code and can
self-replicate. Once active, they may take unwanted and unexpected actions that can
result in either nondestructive or destructive outcomes in the host computer programs.
The virus program may also move into multiple platforms, data files, or devices on a
system and spread through multiple systems in a network. Virus programs may be
contained in an e-mail attachment and become active when the attachment is opened.

CONCLUSION
It is important for financial institutions to develop and implement appropriate information
security programs. Whether systems are maintained in-house or by third-party vendors,
appropriate security controls and risk management techniques must be employed. A security
program includes effective security policies and system architecture, which may be supported
by the risk assessment tools and practices discussed in this guidance paper and appendix.
Information security threats and vulnerabilities, as well as their countermeasures, will
continue to evolve. As such, institutions should have a proactive risk assessment process that
identifies emerging threats and vulnerabilities to information systems.
A sound information security policy identifies prevention, detection, and response measures.
The appendix provides more details on risk assessment tools and practices that may be used to
improve information security programs. Preventive measures may include regularly using
vulnerability assessment tools and conducting periodic penetration analyses. Intrusion
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detection tools can be effective in detecting potential intrusions or system misuse. Institutions
should also develop a response program to effectively handle any information security
breaches that may occur.

1

For the purposes of this paper, "third-party provider" is broadly defined. Third-party
providers include entities that may provide the following services or products to institutions:
system design, development, administration, and maintenance services; data processing
services; and hardware and/or software solutions.

APPENDIX
PART ONE – PREVENTION: Discusses the use of vulnerability assessment tools and
penetration analyses. When used regularly, both techniques can be integral components of an
institution's information security program.
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT TOOLS
Vulnerability assessment tools, also called security scanning tools, assess the security of
network or host systems and report system vulnerabilities. These tools can scan networks,
servers, firewalls, routers, and applications for vulnerabilities. Generally, the tools can detect
known security flaws or bugs in software and hardware, determine if the systems are
susceptible to known attacks and exploits, and search for system vulnerabilities such as
settings contrary to established security policies.
In evaluating a vulnerability assessment tool, management should consider how frequently the
tool is updated to include the detection of any new weaknesses such as security flaws and
bugs. If there is a time delay before a system patch is made available to correct an identified
weakness, mitigating controls may be needed until the system patch is issued.
Generally, vulnerability assessment tools are not run in real-time, but they are commonly run
on a periodic basis. When using the tools, it is important to ensure that the results from the
scan are secure and only provided to authorized parties. The tools can generate both technical
and management reports, including text, charts, and graphs. The vulnerability assessment
reports can tell a user what weaknesses exist and how to fix them. Some tools can
automatically fix vulnerabilities after detection.
Host- Versus Network-Based Vulnerability Assessment Tools
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As in intrusion detection systems, which are discussed later in this appendix, there are
generally two types of vulnerability assessment tools: host-based and network-based. Another
category is sometimes used for products that assess vulnerabilities of specific applications
(application-based) on a host. A host is generally a single computer or workstation that can be
connected to a computer network. Host-based tools assess the vulnerabilities of specific hosts.
They usually reside on servers, but can be placed on specific desktop computers, routers, or
even firewalls. Network-based vulnerability assessment tools generally reside on the network,
specifically analyzing the network to determine if it is vulnerable to known attacks. Both hostand network-based products offer valuable features, and the risk assessment process should
help an institution determine which is best for its needs. Information systems personnel should
understand the types of tools available, how they operate, where they are located, and the
output generated from the tools.
Host-based vulnerability assessment tools are effective at identifying security risks that result
from internal misuse or hackers using a compromised system. They can detect
holes that would allow access to a system such as unauthorized modems, easily guessed
passwords, and unchanged vendor default passwords. The tools can detect system
vulnerabilities such as poor virus protection capabilities; identify hosts that are configured
improperly; and provide basic information such as user log-on hours, password/account
expiration settings, and users with dial-in access. The tools may also provide a periodic check
to confirm that various security policies are being followed. For instance, they can check user
permissions to access FILes and directories, and identify FILes and directories without
ownership.
Network-based vulnerability assessment tools are more effective than host-based at detecting
network attacks such as denial of service and Internet Protocol (IP) spoofing. Network tools
can detect unauthorized systems on a network or insecure connections to business partners.
Running a host-based scan does not consume network overhead, but can consume processing
time and available storage on the host. Conversely, frequently running a network-based scan
as part of daily operations increases network traffic during the scan. This may cause
inadvertent network problems such as router crashes.
PENETRATION ANALYSIS
After the initial risk assessment is completed, management may determine that a penetration
analysis (test) should be conducted. For the purpose of this paper, "penetration analysis" is
broadly defined. Bank management should determine the scope and objectives of the analysis.
The scope can range from a specific test of a particular information system's security or a
review of multiple information security processes in an institution.
A penetration analysis usually involves a team of experts who identify an information system's
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vulnerability to a series of attacks. The evaluators may attempt to circumvent the security
features of a system by exploiting the identified vulnerabilities. Similar to running
vulnerability scanning tools, the objective of a penetration analysis is to locate system
vulnerabilities so that appropriate corrective steps can be taken.
The analysis can apply to any institution with a network, but becomes more important if
system access is allowed via an external connection such as the Internet. The analysis should
be independent and may be conducted by a trusted third party, qualified internal audit team, or
a combination of both. The information security policy should address the frequency and
scope of the analysis. In determining the scope of the analysis, items to consider include
internal vs. external threats, systems to include in the test, testing methods, and system
architectures.
A penetration analysis is a snapshot of the security at a point in time and does not provide a
complete guaranty that the system(s) being tested is secure. It can test the effectiveness of
security controls and preparedness measures. Depending on the scope of the analysis, the
evaluators may work under the same constraints applied to ordinary internal or external users.
Conversely, the evaluators may use all system design and implementation documentation. It is
common for the evaluators to be given just the IP address of the
institution and any other public information, such as a listing of officers that is normally
available to outside hackers. The evaluators may use vulnerability assessment tools, and
employ some of the attack methods discussed in this paper such as social engineering and war
dialing. After completing the agreed-upon analysis, the evaluators should provide the
institution a detailed written report. The report should identify vulnerabilities, prioritize
weaknesses, and provide recommendations for corrective action.
A penetration analysis itself can introduce new risks to an institution; therefore, several items
should be considered before having an analysis completed, including the following:





If using outside testers, the reputation of the firm or consultants hired. The evaluators
will assess the weaknesses in the bank's information security system. As such, the
confidentiality of results and bank data is crucial. Just like screening potential
employees prior to their hire, banks should carefully screen firms, consultants, and
subcontractors who are entrusted with access to sensitive data. A bank may want to
require security clearance checks on the evaluators. An institution should ask if the
evaluators have liability insurance in case something goes wrong during the test. The
bank should enter into a written contact with the evaluators, which at a minimum
should address the above items.
If using internal testers, the independence of the testers from system administrators.
The secrecy of the test. Some senior executives may order an analysis without the
knowledge of information systems personnel. This can create unwanted results,
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including the notification of law enforcement personnel and wasted resources
responding to an attack. To prevent excessive responses to the attacks, bank
management may consider informing certain individuals in the organization of the
penetration analysis.
The importance of the systems to be tested. Some systems may be too critical to be
exposed to some of the methods used by the evaluators such as a critical database that
could be damaged during the test.

PART TWO – DETECTION: Discusses intrusion detection systems, and using these tools as
the detection component of an institution's information security program.
INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS
Vulnerability assessments and penetration analyses help ensure that appropriate security
precautions have been implemented and that system security configurations are appropriate.
The next step is to monitor the system for intrusions and unusual activities. Intrusion detection
systems (IDSs) may be useful because they act as a burglar alarm, reporting potential
intrusions to appropriate personnel. By analyzing the information generated by the systems
being guarded, IDSs help determine if necessary safeguards are in place and are protecting the
system as intended. In addition, they can be configured to automatically respond to intrusions.
Computer system components or applications can generate detailed, lengthy logs or audit
trails that system administrators can manually review for unusual events. IDSs automate the
review of logs and audit data, which increases the review's overall efficiency by reducing
costs and the time and level of skill necessary to review the logs.
Typically, there are three components to an IDS. First is an agent, which is the component that
actually collects the information. Second is a manager, which processes the information
collected by the agents. Third is a console, which allows authorized information systems
personnel to remotely install and upgrade agents, define intrusion detection scenarios across
agents, and track intrusions as they occur. Depending on the complexity of the IDS, there can
be multiple agent and manager components.
Generally, IDS products use three different methods to detect intrusions. First, they can look
for identified attack signatures, which are streams or patterns of data previously identified as
an attack. Second, they can look for system misuse such as unauthorized attempts to access
FILes or disallowed traffic inside the firewall. Third, they can look for activities that are
different from the user's or system's normal pattern. These "anomaly-based" products (which
use artificial intelligence) are designed to detect subtle changes or new attack patterns, and
then notify appropriate personnel that an intrusion may be occurring. Some anomaly-based
products are created to update normal use patterns on a regular basis. Poorly designed
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anomaly-based products can trigger frequent false-positive responses.
Although IDSs may be an integral part of an institution's overall system security, they will not
protect a system from previously unknown threats or vulnerabilities. They are not selfsufficient and do not compensate for weak authentication procedures (e.g., when an intruder
already knows a password to access the system). Also, IDSs often have overlapping features
with other security products, such as firewalls. IDSs provide additional protections by helping
to determine if the firewall programs are working properly and by helping to detect internal
abuses. Both firewalls and IDSs need to be properly configured and updated to combat new
types of attacks. In addition, management should be aware that the state of these products is
highly dynamic and IDS capabilities are evolving.
IDS tools can generate both technical and management reports, including text, charts, and
graphs. The IDS reports can provide background information on the type of attack and
recommend courses of action. When an intrusion is detected, the IDS can automatically begin
to collect additional information on the attacker, which may be needed later for documentation
purposes.
Host- Versus Network-Based IDS Tools
As with vulnerability assessment tools, there are generally two types of IDS products: hostbased and network-based. A third product category is sometimes used for IDSs that look for
unusual application events (application-based) on a host. Both network- and host-based tools
offer valuable features, and the risk assessment process should help institutions determine if
either, or a combination of both, is best for their needs.
Host-Based IDSs
Host-based IDSs are also known as audit trail analysis tools or server-based IDSs (often
placed on servers). A host-based IDS will look for potential intrusions or patterns of misuse by
monitoring host event activities, audit logs, and other security-related activities. The tools will
track audit trails from operating systems, applications, Web servers, routers, and firewalls, as
well as monitor critical FILes for Trojan horses and unauthorized changes. This can provide
valuable evidence of a break-in and can assist in assessing damage because the intruder's
actions are logged on the specific hosts. If done in real-time, the IDS can promptly notify the
bank of unauthorized attempts to gain system administrator (root) controls, access or change
critical files, or replace log-in programs.
An important benefit of host-based IDSs is that they are effective in detecting insider misuse
because they monitor activities on the specific hosts. For example, they can monitor a user's
attempt to access a restricted file, or an attempt to execute a system administrator's command.
In addition, they can monitor encrypted transmissions as the data is generally decrypted before
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it is logged at the host.
A problem with host-based systems is that notification of the attack is delayed if an agent does
not examine the audit trail in real-time. This problem relates to the relatively large
consumption of computer processing speed and disk space that is required to run these
programs in real-time. If not run in real-time, they still allow a bank to identify larger trends
and problems with system security.
Network-Based IDSs
With network-based IDSs, software or sniffers are placed on one or multiple points
across the network. The sniffer agent analyzes packets of information moving across the
network for potential intrusions. Network packets contain data, including the message and
headers that identify the sending and receiving parties. Network-based IDSs look for patterns
of misuse, specific types of attacks, and unusual activity such as unexpected volume and types
of network traffic. Compared to host-based IDSs, certain types of network-orientated attacks
such as IP spoofing, packet floods, and denial of service, are best detected through packet
examination.
Network-based IDSs can detect potential intrusions in real-time, and offer concurrent
notification and response capabilities to potential intrusions. The software does not need to be
put on the various hosts throughout the network, thus it is generally easier to monitor and may
be less expensive than host-based IDSs.
Network-based IDSs sometimes mistakenly identify normal traffic as an intrusion ("false
positives") and vice versa ("false negatives"). They can have difficulties detecting slow attacks
and experience problems with busy networks. Network-based IDSs cannot monitor encrypted
transmissions (only detect that data is being transferred across the network), and are less
effective at detecting insider misuse because network packet analysis does not monitor the
activities on specific hosts.
Factors to Consider in Evaluating IDSs
Once it is determined that an IDS is necessary to detect possible security breaches, several
factors should be considered in evaluating IDSs, including:


The comprehensiveness of the attack signature database, including the frequency of
updates that incorporate newly identified concerns. Most products rely on vendor
updates, so banks need to assess the timeliness of the IDS vendor's updates. Products
can be updated through Internet downloads, CD-ROM or floppy disk updates, or even
manually if the user has a sufficient degree of technical knowledge.
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The effectiveness of the IDS in protecting an institution from both internal and
external threats to a computer system. The IDS should limit the number of false
positives (incorrectly identifying an attack when none has occurred) and false
negatives (not identifying an attack when one has occurred).
The impact on performance of the network and/or host(s). Generally, IDSs work on a
real-time basis. Real-time analysis provides quicker notification of potential intrusions;
however, it can reduce system performance due to the additional memory and
processing requirements. Non-real-time analysis generally consumes fewer resources,
but has the disadvantage that the potential intrusion has already occurred.
Knowledgeable intruders, moreover, can manipulate audit trails, making the after-thefact analysis useless in detecting these particular intruders.
The security of the IDS itself and how secure the update process is, especially if
updated remotely.
The reporting and automated response capabilities. IDSs will sometimes generate more
information than can be reviewed by present qualified staff. Also, for privacy
reasons, management should consider informing all affected system users about the
scope and type of monitoring being conducted.

Other things to consider include training and support from the vendor, cost of hardware,
software, and maintenance agreements, integration with vulnerability assessment tools, and
configuration capabilities.
Determining Which is Best for an Institution
An institution's risk assessment process should first determine whether an IDS is necessary.
Next, the type or placement of an IDS depends on the priority of identified threats or
vulnerabilities. If one or a few hosts contain information that management views as critical, a
host-based IDS may be warranted. If the information is less essential, other controls such as a
firewall and/or filtering routers may be sufficient to protect the information. If an institution is
primarily concerned with attacks from the outside or views the entire network system as
critical, a network-based product may be appropriate. A combination of host- and networkbased IDSs may also be appropriate for effective system security. Management should be
aware that even after an IDS is in place, there may be other access points to the bank's systems
that are not being monitored. Management should determine what types of security
precautions are needed for the other access points.
The placement of the IDS within the institution's system architecture should be carefully
considered. The primary benefit of placing an IDS inside a firewall is the detection of attacks
that penetrate the firewall as well as insider abuses. The primary benefit of placing an IDS
outside of a firewall is the ability to detect such activities as sweeping, which can be the first
sign of attack; repeated failed log-in attempts; and attempted denial of service and spoofing
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attacks. Placing an IDS outside the firewall will also allow the monitoring of traffic that the
firewall stops.
PART THREE – RESPONSE: Discusses implementing an incident response strategy for the
response component of an institution's information security program.
INCIDENT RESPONSE
After implementing a defense strategy and monitoring for new attacks, hacker activities, and
unauthorized insider access, management should develop a response strategy. The
sophistication of an incident response plan will vary depending on the risks inherent in each
system deployed and the resources available to an institution. In developing a response
strategy or plan, management should consider the following:








The plan should provide a platform from which an institution can prepare for, address,
and respond to intrusions or unauthorized activity. The beginning point is to assess the
systems at risk, as identified in the overall risk assessment, and consider the potential
types of security incidents.
The plan should identify what constitutes a break-in or system misuse, and incidents
should be prioritized by the seriousness of the attack or system misuse.
Individuals should be appointed and empowered with the latitude and authority to
respond to an incident. The plan should include what the appropriate responses may be
for potential intrusions or system misuses.
A recovery plan should be established, and in some cases, an incident response team
should be identified.
The plan should include procedures to officially report the incidents to senior
management, the board of directors, legal counsel, and law enforcement agents as
appropriate.

Today's products not only can detect intrusions in real-time, but can automatically respond to
intrusions. Depending on the software, information systems personnel can be notified on a
real-time basis during an attack, rather than detect the attack afterward during a manual log
review. Methods of notification can include e-mail, pager, fax, audio alarm, or message
displays on a computer monitor. Responses can include shutting down the system, logging
additional information, and disabling a user's account (e.g., by disallowing a particular user
account or Internet address). Access can be disabled for a period sufficient for information
systems personnel to review the attack information or verify the user. Also, an institution can
add warning banners to protected systems, notifying users that they are accessing a protected
computer system.
When determining an appropriate response, a distinction should be made between incidents in
which actual changes to a system are suspected (e.g., changing audit logs) versus incidents in
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which system misuse is suspected (e.g., unauthorized system access). Attempts to actually
change the system or data may warrant notifying a security officer, who could reconfigure the
identified weaknesses and/or communication paths. An appropriate response to system misuse
may include automatic log-off, warning messages, or notifying the appropriate personnel.
Not only are attacks often undetected, in many cases identified attacks are not reported.
Institutions should develop a plan to respond to unauthorized activities and involve law
enforcement when appropriate. Institutions should report suspected computer crimes and
computer intrusions on Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) in accordance with the guidelines
outlined in Financial Institution Letter 124-97, "Suspicious Activity Reporting," dated
December 5, 1997.

Appendix B:
FDIC FIL 81-05

Instructions for Completing the Information Technology Examination Officer’s
Questionnaire
Please answer the following information security program questions as of the
examination
date pre-determined by the FDIC. The majority of the questions require only a “Yes” or
“No” response; however, you are encouraged to expand or clarify any response as needed
directly below each question, or at the end of this document under the heading
“Clarifying or Additional Comments”. For any question deemed non-applicable to your
institution or if the answer is “None”, please respond accordingly (“NA” or “None”).
Please do not leave responses blank. At the bottom of this document is a signature block,
which must be signed by an executive officer attesting to the accuracy and completeness
of all provided information.

144

I hereby certify that the following statements are true and correct to the best of my
knowledge and belief.
Officer’s Name and Title
Institution’s Name and Location

Officer’s Signature

Date Signed

As of Date

This is an official document. Any false information contained in it may be grounds for
prosecution and may be punishable by fine or imprisonment.
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PART 1 – RISK ASSESSMENT
An IT risk assessment is a multi-step process of identifying and quantifying threats to
information assets in an effort to determine cost effective risk management solutions. To
help us assess your risk management practices and the actions taken as a result of your
risk assessment, please answer the following questions:
a. Name and title of individual(s) responsible for managing the IT risk assessment
process:
b. Names and titles of individuals, committees, departments or others participating
in the risk assessment process. If third-party assistance was utilized during this
process, please provide the name and address of the firm providing the assistance
and a brief description of the services provided:
c. Completion date of your most recent risk assessment:
d. Is your risk assessment process governed by a formal framework/policy (Y/N)?
e. Does the scope of your risk assessment include an analysis of internal and
external threats to confidential customer and consumer information as described
in Part 364, Appendix B, of the FDIC’s Rules and Regulations (Y/N)?
f. Do you have procedures for maintaining asset inventories (Y/N)?
g. Do risk assessment findings clearly identify the assets requiring risk reduction
strategies (Y/N)?
h. Do written information security policies and procedures reflect risk reduction
strategies identified in “g” above (Y/N)?
i. Is your risk assessment program formally approved by the Board of Directors at
least annually (Y/N)?
If yes, please provide the date that the risk assessment program was last approved
by the Board of Directors:
j. Are risk assessment findings presented to the Board of Directors for review and
acceptance (Y/N)?
If yes, please provide the date that the risk assessment findings were last approved
by the Board of Directors:
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PART 2 – OPERATIONS SECURITY AND RISK MANAGEMENT
To help us assess how you manage risk through your information security program,
please answer the following questions for your environment. If any of the following
questions are not applicable to your environment, simply answer “N/A.”
a. Please provide the name and title of your formally designated IT security
officer:
b. Please provide the name and title of personnel in charge of operations:
c. Do you maintain topologies, diagrams, or schematics depicting your physical
and logical operating environment(s) (Y/N)?
d. Does your information security program contain written policies, procedures,
and guidelines for securing, maintaining, and monitoring the following systems
or platforms:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Core banking system (Y/N)?
Imaging (Y/N)?
Fed Line and/or wire transfer (Y/N)?
Local area networking (Y/N)?
Wide-area networking (Y/N)?
Wireless networking – LAN or WAN (Y/N)?
Virtual private networking (Y/N)?
Voice over IP telephony (Y/N)?
Instant messaging (Y/N)?
Portable devices such as PDAs, laptops, cell phones, etc. (Y/N)?
Routers (Y/N)?
Modems or modem pools (Y/N)?
Security devices such as firewall(s) and proxy devices. (Y/N)?
Other remote access connectivity such as GoToMyPC, PcAnyWhere, etc.
(Y/N)?
15. Other – please list:
e. Do you have formal logging/monitoring requirements for 1-15 above (Y/N)?
f. Do you have formal configuration, change management, and patch
management procedures for all applicable platforms identified in “d.” above
(Y/N)?
g. Do you have an antivirus management program to protect systems from
malicious content (Y/N)?
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h. Do you have an anti-spyware management program to protect end-user
systems (Y/N)?
i. Do you have a formal intrusion detection program, other than basic logging,
for monitoring host and/or network activity (Y/N)?

Instructions for Completing the Information Technology Examination Officer’s
Questionnaire
Please answer the following information security program questions as of the examination
date pre-determined by the FDIC. The majority of the questions require only a “Yes” or
“No” response; however, you are encouraged to expand or clarify any response as needed
directly below each question, or at the end of this document under the heading “Clarifying or
Additional Comments”. For any question deemed non-applicable to your institution or if the
answer is “None”, please respond accordingly (“NA” or “None”). Please do not leave
responses blank. At the bottom of this document is a signature block, which must be signed
by an executive officer attesting to the accuracy and completeness of all provided
information.

I hereby certify that the following statements are true and correct to the best of my knowledge
and belief.
Officer’s Name and Title
Institution’s Name and Location

Officer’s Signature

Date Signed

As of Date

This is an official document. Any false information contained in it may be grounds for
prosecution and may be punishable by fine or imprisonment.
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PART 1 – RISK ASSESSMENT
An IT risk assessment is a multi-step process of identifying and quantifying threats to
information assets in an effort to determine cost effective risk management solutions. To
help us assess your risk management practices and the actions taken as a result of your
risk assessment, please answer the following questions:
a. Name and title of individual(s) responsible for managing the IT risk assessment
process:
k. Names and titles of individuals, committees, departments or others participating in
the risk assessment process. If third-party assistance was utilized during this process,
please provide the name and address of the firm providing the assistance and a brief
description of the services provided:
l. Completion date of your most recent risk assessment:
m. Is your risk assessment process governed by a formal framework/policy (Y/N)?
n. Does the scope of your risk assessment include an analysis of internal and external
threats to confidential customer and consumer information as described in Part 364,
Appendix B, of the FDIC’s Rules and Regulations (Y/N)?
o. Do you have procedures for maintaining asset inventories (Y/N)?
p. Do risk assessment findings clearly identify the assets requiring risk reduction
strategies (Y/N)?
q. Do written information security policies and procedures reflect risk reduction
strategies identified in “g” above (Y/N)?
r. Is your risk assessment program formally approved by the Board of Directors at least
annually (Y/N)?
If yes, please provide the date that the risk assessment program was last approved by
the Board of Directors:
s. Are risk assessment findings presented to the Board of Directors for review and
acceptance (Y/N)?
If yes, please provide the date that the risk assessment findings were last approved by
the Board of Directors:
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PART 2 – OPERATIONS SECURITY AND RISK MANAGEMENT
To help us assess how you manage risk through your information security program, please
answer the following questions for your environment. If any of the following questions are
not applicable to your environment, simply answer “N/A.”
e. Please provide the name and title of your formally designated IT security officer:
f. Please provide the name and title of personnel in charge of operations:
g. Do you maintain topologies, diagrams, or schematics depicting your physical and
logical operating environment(s) (Y/N)?
h. Does your information security program contain written policies, procedures, and
guidelines for securing, maintaining, and monitoring the following systems or
platforms:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Core banking system (Y/N)?
Imaging (Y/N)?
Fed Line and/or wire transfer (Y/N)?
Local area networking (Y/N)?
Wide-area networking (Y/N)?
Wireless networking – LAN or WAN (Y/N)?
Virtual private networking (Y/N)?
Voice over IP telephony (Y/N)?
Instant messaging (Y/N)?
Portable devices such as PDAs, laptops, cell phones, etc. (Y/N)?
Routers (Y/N)?
Modems or modem pools (Y/N)?
Security devices such as firewall(s) and proxy devices. (Y/N)?
Other remote access connectivity such as GoToMyPC, PcAnyWhere, etc.
(Y/N)?
15. Other – please list:
e. Do you have formal logging/monitoring requirements for 1-15
above (Y/N)?
f. Do you have formal configuration, change management, and
patch management procedures for all applicable platforms
identified in “d.” above (Y/N)?
g. Do you have an antivirus management program to protect systems
from malicious content (Y/N)?
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h. Do you have an anti-spyware management program to protect
end-user systems (Y/N)?
i. Do you have a formal intrusion detection program, other than basic
logging, for monitoring host and/or network activity (Y/N)?

j. Has vulnerability testing been performed on internal systems (Y/N)?
If yes, please provide date performed and by whom:
k. Has penetration testing of your public or Internet-facing
connection(s) been performed (Y/N)?
If yes, please provide date performed and by whom:
l. Do you have an incident response plan defining responsibilities
and duties for containing damage and minimizing risks to the
institution (Y/N)?
If yes, does the plan include customer notification procedures (Y/N)?
m. Do you have a physical security program defining and restricting
access to information assets (Y/N)?
n. Do you have a vendor management program (Y/N)?
o. Are all of your service providers located within the United States
(Y/N)?
p. Do you have an employee acceptable use policy (Y/N)?
If yes, please provide how often employees must attest to the
policy contents:
q. Do you have an employee security awareness training program (Y/N)?
If yes, please indicate the last date training was provided:
r. Are you planning to deploy new technology within the next 12
months (Y/N)?
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If you answered “Yes”, were the risks associated with this new
technology reviewed during your most recent risk assessment (Y/N)?
s. Have you deployed new technology since the last FDIC examination
that was not included in your last risk assessment (Y/N)?
t.
Is security incorporated into your overall strategic
planning process (Y/N)?
u. Do you have policies/procedures for the proper disposal of information
assets (Y/N)?
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PART 3 – AUDIT/INDEPENDENT REVIEW PROGRAM
To help us assess how you monitor operations and compliance with your written
information security program, please answer the following questions:
a.

Please provide the name and title of your IT auditor or employee
performing internal IT audit functions. Include who this person reports to,
and a brief description of their education and experience conducting IT audits.

b.

Do you have a written IT audit/independent review program (Y/N)?

c.

Please provide the following information regarding your most recent IT
audit/independent review:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Audit Date:
Firm name (if external):
Was an audit report produced (Y/N)?
Date audit report was reviewed and approved by the Board:
Audit scope and objectives:

d.

Does audit coverage include a comparison of actual system configurations to
documented/baseline configuration standards (Y/N)?

e.

Does audit coverage include assessing compliance with the information
security program requirements (Y/N)?

f.

Does audit coverage include assessing users and system services access
rights (Y/N)?

g

Is audit involved in your risk assessment process (Y/N)?

h.
or

Briefly describe any security incidents (internal or external) affecting the bank
bank customers occurring since the last FDIC IT examination.

i.

Briefly describe any known conflicts or concentrations of duties.
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PART 4 - DISASTER RECOVERY AND BUSINESS CONTINUITY
To help us assess your preparedness for responding to and recovering from an
unexpected event, please answer the following:
a.

Do you have an organization-wide disaster recovery and business
continuity program (Y/N)?
If yes, please provide the name of your coordinator:

b.

Are disaster recovery and business continuity plans based upon a business
impact analyses (Y/N)?
If yes, do the plans identify recovery and processing priorities (Y/N)?

c.

Is disaster recovery and business continuity included in your risk
assessment (Y/N)?

d.

Do you have formal agreements for an alternate processing site and equipment
should the need arise to relocate operations (Y/N)?

e.

Do business continuity plans address procedures and priorities for
returning to permanent and normal operations (Y/N)?

f.

Do you maintain offsite backups of critical information (Y/N)?
If “Yes,” is the process formally documented and audited (Y/N)?

g.

Do you have procedures for testing backup media at an offsite location (Y/N)?

h.

Have disaster recovery/business continuity plans been tested (Y/N)?
If “Yes”, please identify the system(s) tested, the corresponding test date, and
the date reported to the Board:
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PART 5 – Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act/FDIC Rules and Regulations – 12 CFR Part 364
Appendix B
The Interagency Guidelines Establishing Information Security Standards require each
bank to have a comprehensive written information security program that includes
administrative, technical, and physical safeguards appropriate to the size and complexity
of the bank and the nature and scope of its activities. Please answer the following
questions pertaining to your written information security program:
a.

Has management developed a written information security program
meeting the information security standards of Part 364,
Appendix B (Y/N)?
If you answered “Yes” to question “a” above, please provide the date that
the Board of Directors last approved the written information security
program:

b.

Please provide the names and titles and/or committee members charged
with formally overseeing and implementing Part 364, Appendix B,
requirements:

c.

Are compliance audits of your Part 364 standards periodically performed
and formally reported to the Board of Directors (Y/N)?
If you answered “Yes” to question “c”, please provide the date of your
last Part 364 compliance audit or review:

d.

Have employees received Part 364 related security awareness
training (Y/N)?

e.

Please describe the bank’s reporting process for communicating Part
364 program and compliance status to the Board of Directors:
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j. Has vulnerability testing been performed on internal systems (Y/N)?
If yes, please provide date performed and by whom:
k. Has penetration testing of your public or Internet-facing connection(s) been
performed (Y/N)?
If yes, please provide date performed and by whom:
l. Do you have an incident response plan defining responsibilities and duties for
containing damage and minimizing risks to the institution (Y/N)?
If yes, does the plan include customer notification procedures (Y/N)?
m. Do you have a physical security program defining and restricting access to
information assets (Y/N)?
n. Do you have a vendor management program (Y/N)?
o. Are all of your service providers located within the United States (Y/N)?
p. Do you have an employee acceptable use policy (Y/N)?
If yes, please provide how often employees must attest to the policy contents:
q. Do you have an employee security awareness training program (Y/N)?
If yes, please indicate the last date training was provided:
r. Are you planning to deploy new technology within the next 12 months (Y/N)?
If you answered “Yes”, were the risks associated with this new technology
reviewed during your most recent risk assessment (Y/N)?
s. Have you deployed new technology since the last FDIC examination that
was not included in your last risk assessment (Y/N)?
v. Is security incorporated into your overall strategic planning process (Y/N)?
w. Do you have policies/procedures for the proper disposal of information assets
(Y/N)?
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PART 3 – AUDIT/INDEPENDENT REVIEW PROGRAM
To help us assess how you monitor operations and compliance with your written
information security program, please answer the following questions:
a.

Please provide the name and title of your IT auditor or employee
performing internal IT audit functions. Include who this person
reports to, and a brief description of their education and experience
conducting IT audits.

b.

Do you have a written IT audit/independent review program (Y/N)?

c.

Please provide the following information regarding your most recent
IT audit/independent review:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Audit Date:
Firm name (if external):
Was an audit report produced (Y/N)?
Date audit report was reviewed and approved by the Board:
Audit scope and objectives:

d.

Does audit coverage include a comparison of actual system configurations to
documented/baseline configuration standards (Y/N)?

e.

Does audit coverage include assessing compliance with the information
security program requirements (Y/N)?

f.

Does audit coverage include assessing users and system services access
rights (Y/N)?

g

Is audit involved in your risk assessment process (Y/N)?

h.

Briefly describe any security incidents (internal or external) affecting
the bank or bank customers occurring since the last FDIC IT examination.

j.

Briefly describe any known conflicts or concentrations of duties.
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PART 4 - DISASTER RECOVERY AND BUSINESS CONTINUITY
To help us assess your preparedness for responding to and recovering from an
unexpected event, please answer the following:
a.

Do you have an organization-wide disaster recovery and business
continuity program (Y/N)?
If yes, please provide the name of your coordinator:

b.

Are disaster recovery and business continuity plans based upon a business
impact analyses (Y/N)?
If yes, do the plans identify recovery and processing priorities (Y/N)?

c.

Is disaster recovery and business continuity included in your risk
assessment (Y/N)?

d.

Do you have formal agreements for an alternate processing site and
equipment should the need arise to relocate operations (Y/N)?

e.

Do business continuity plans address procedures and priorities for
returning to permanent and normal operations (Y/N)?

f.

Do you maintain offsite backups of critical information (Y/N)?
If “Yes,” is the process formally documented and audited (Y/N)?

g.

Do you have procedures for testing backup media at an offsite location (Y/N)?

h.

Have disaster recovery/business continuity plans been tested (Y/N)?
If “Yes”, please identify the system(s) tested, the corresponding test date, and
the date reported to the Board:
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PART 5 – Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act/FDIC Rules and Regulations – 12 CFR Part 364
Appendix B
The Interagency Guidelines Establishing Information Security Standards require each
bank to have a comprehensive written information security program that includes
administrative, technical, and physical safeguards appropriate to the size and complexity
of the bank and the nature and scope of its activities. Please answer the following
questions pertaining to your written information security program:
a.

Has management developed a written information security program
meeting the information security standards of Part 364, Appendix B
(Y/N)?
If you answered “Yes” to question “a” above, please provide the date that
the Board of Directors last approved the written information security
program:

b.

Please provide the names and titles and/or committee members charged
with formally overseeing and implementing Part 364, Appendix B,
requirements:

c.

Are compliance audits of your Part 364 standards periodically performed
and formally reported to the Board of Directors (Y/N)?
If you answered “Yes” to question “c”, please provide the date of your last
Part 364 compliance audit or review:

d.

Have employees received Part 364 related security awareness
training (Y/N)?

e.

Please describe the bank’s reporting process for communicating Part 364
program and compliance status to the Board of Directors:
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Appendix C
Assets Typical to Small and Medium Sized Financial Institutions

Internet
Banking
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Fund Transfer
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Website
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Desktop
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Software
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Lending
Program
Router

Email Server
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Software

Call Reporting
Software
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Background
Checking
Website
Operating
Systems

File Server

Item Imaging

VoIP

Deb/Credit
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Network

Wide Area
Network

Marketing
Software
Switch

Local Area
Network
Bank Website

Proof System

PDA’s
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Anti-Virus
Software

Web Server

Merchant Card
Processing
System
Check Ordering
Website
Application
Server

Intrusion
Detection
System
Check Reader /
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Remote
Capture
Systems
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Appendix D
Controls Typical to Small and Medium Sized Financial Institutions

Authorized User
Restrictions

Access Logs

Formal TSP Review

Formal TSP Selection

Disable Terminated
Employee Account

Access Log
Monitoring

Invalid Attempt
Lockout

Strong Passwords

Unique User Accounts Encrypt Stored Data Formal Patching
Process
Intrusion Detection / Back-up Critical DataChange Default
Prevention Systems
Security Settings
Incident Response
Business Continuity Clear Screen
Program Test
Plan
Awareness
Maintenance Logs
Multi-factor
System Access
Authentication
Warning
Activity Logs
Change Default
Maintenance Log
Account Settings
Review
Vulnerability
Off-Site Backup
Assessment
Administrative
Privileges
Business Continuity PlanNetwork Diagram
Test
Spyware Protection
Penetration Testing
Monitored Locations
Maintenance Log
Review
Disable/Remove
Hardware

Physical Security
Awareness
Network Diagram

Activity Log
Monitoring

Inactive Lockout
Incident Response
Program
Forced Session
Expiration
Vulnerability
Assessment
Temporarily Disable
Absents Employee
Accounts
Last Successful Logon

Test Back-up RecoveryVirus Protection
Social Engineering andSecurity Cameras
Security Awareness
Motion Sensors
Restricted Access Areas
Privacy Filer

Dual Power Supply

Redundant Systems Temperature Control Humidity Control
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Dust Filtering

Power Conditioning Backup Generator

Test Back-up Recovery Line Disconnect
Encryption
Internet History
Monitoring

Locked Door

Secured Rack or CageAlert Reporting
Internet History
for IT assets
Removable Media Offsite Removal of files
File storage on portable
Ban- Personal
device ban

Appendix E
Controls specific to assets

Deposit Platform:
Test Back-up Recovery
Network Diagram
Business Continuity Plan Test
Last Successful Logon
Activity Log Monitoring
Off-Site Backup
Vulnerability Assessment: Administrative Privileges
Temporarily Disable Absent Employee
Accounts
Maintenance Log Review
Change Default Account Settings
Activity Logs

Uninterruptible Power
Supply
Monitor Placement
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Vulnerability Assessment
System Access Warning
Multi-Factor Authentication
Maintenance Logs
Forced Session Expiration
Clear Screen Awareness
Business Continuity Plan
Incident Response Program Test
Incident Response Program
Change Default Security Settings
Back-up Critical Data
Intrusion Detection / Prevention
Inactive Lockout
Formal Patching Process
Encrypt Stored Data
Unique User Accounts
Strong Passwords
Invalid Attempt Lockout
Disable Terminated Employee Accounts
Access Log Monitoring
Formal TSP Selection
Formal TSP Review
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Access Logs
Unauthorized Access Restrictions

FinCen:
Strong Passwords
Virus Protection
Spyware Protection
Business Continuity Plan
Encrypt Stored Data
Activity Log Monitoring
Social Engineering Security Awareness
Penetration Testing
Clear Screen Awareness
Forced Session Expiration
Encrypt Transmitted Data
Change Default Security Settings
Change Default Account Settings
Activity Logs
Temporarily Disable Absent Employee Accounts
Last Successful Logon
Inactive Lockout
Formal TSP Selection
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Formal TSP Review
Disable Terminated Employee Accounts
Incident Response Program Test
Incident Response Program
System Access Warning
Authorized User Restrictions
Access Log Monitoring
Multi-Factor Authentication
Invalid Attempt Lockout
Access Logs
Unique User Accounts

ATM:
Monitored Location
Incident Response Program Test
Incident Response Program
Business Continuity Plan Test
Business Continuity Plan
Restricted Access Area
Motion Sensors
Formal TSP Selection
Formal TSP Review
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Physical Security Awareness
Security Cameras

Anti-Virus Software:
Inactive Lockout
Clear Screen Awareness
Network Diagram
Maintenance Log Review
Vulnerability Assessment: Administrative Privileges

Temporarily Disable Absent Employee Accounts
Intrusion Detection / Prevention
Change Default Account Settings
Business Continuity Plan Test
Vulnerability Assessment
Maintenance Logs
Last Successful Logon
Social Engineering Security Awareness
Incident Response Program Test
Incident Response Program
Change Default Security Settings
Formal Patching Process
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Multi-Factor Authentication
Disable Terminated Employee Accounts
Business Continuity Plan
Invalid Attempt Lockout
Access Logs
Unique User Accounts
Strong Passwords
Formal TSP Selection
Formal TSP Review

Check Ordering Website:
Strong Passwords
Business Continuity Plan
Social Engineering Security Awareness
Virus Protection
Spyware Protection
Formal TSP Selection
Formal TSP Review
Privacy Filter
Penetration Testing
Encrypt Stored Data
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Clear Screen Awareness
Temporarily Disable Absent Employee Accounts
Monitor Placement
Encrypt Transmitted Data
Forced Session Expiration
Change Default Account Settings
Change Default Security Settings
Authorized User Restrictions
System Access Warning
Inactive Lockout
Multi-Factor Authentication
Invalid Attempt Lockout
Disable Terminated Employee Accounts
Unique User Accounts

Website:
Strong Passwords
Temporarily Disable Absent Employee Accounts
Forced Session Expiration
Social Engineering Security Awareness
Last Successful Logon
Change Default Security Settings
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Clear Screen Awareness
Encrypt Transmitted Data
Incident Response Program Test
Incident Response Program
Monitor Placement
Disable Terminated Employee Accounts
Inactive Lockout
Multi-Factor Authentication
Invalid Attempt Lockout
Authorized User Restrictions
Unique User Accounts

Core System
Incidence Response Program
Privacy Filter
Security Cameras
Restricted Access Area
Physical Security Awareness
Monitored Location
Test Back-up Recovery
Business Continuity Plan Test
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Dual Power Supply
Temporarily Disable Absent Employee Accounts
Secured Rack/Cage
Monitor Placement
Locked Door
Line Disconnect
Spyware Protection
Activity Log Monitoring
Vulnerability Assessment: Administrative Privileges
Encrypt Transmitted Data
Formal TSP Selection
Formal TSP Review
Virus Protection
Remove Unnecessary Software
Business Continuity Plan
Access Log Monitoring
Back-up Critical Data
Last Successful Logon
Forced Session Expiration
Change Default Security Settings
Activity Logs
Alert Reporting
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Change Default Account Settings
Inactive Lockout
Encrypt Stored Data
Vulnerability Assessment
Formal Patching Process
Disable Terminated Employee Accounts
Access Logs
Multi-Factor Authentication
Invalid Attempt Lockout
Firewall
Intrusion Detection / Prevention
Unique User Accounts
Strong Passwords
Incident Response Program Test
Authorized User Restrictions
Maintenance Logs
Redundant Systems
Temperature Control
Humidity Control
Dust Filtering
Disable / Remove Hardware
Power Conditioning
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Network Diagram
Backup Generator
Social Engineering Security Awareness
Off-Site Backup
Uninterruptible Power Supply
Motion Sensors
Maintenance Log Review
Penetration Testing
Clear Screen Awareness

Desktop Computers
Intrusion Protection / Prevention
Off-Site Backup
Disable / Remove Hardware
Business Continuity Plan Test
Dual Power Supply
Network Diagram
Maintenance Logs
Maintenance Log Review
Inactive Lockout
Clear Screen Awareness
Monitor Placement
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Encrypt Transmitted Data
Temporarily Disable Absent Employee Accounts
Access Log Monitoring
Restricted Access Area
Malware Awareness
Power Conditioning
Back-up Critical Data
Authorized User Restrictions
Spyware Protection
Uninterruptible Power Supply
Motion Sensors
Vulnerability Assessment: Administrative Privileges
Multi-Factor Authentication
Virus Protection
Physical Security Awareness
Access Logs
Remove Unnecessary Software
Security Cameras
Monitored Location
Incident Response Program Test
Last Successful Logon
Forced Session Expiration
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Change Default Security Settings
Disable Unnecessary Services
Encrypt Stored Data
Incident Response Program
Disable Terminated Employee Accounts
Invalid Attempt Lockout
Unique User Accounts
Strong Passwords
Change Default Account Settings
Vulnerability Assessment
Formal Patching Process
Penetration Testing
Test Back-up Plan
Business Continuity Plan

Email:
Invalid Attempt Lockout
Physical Security Awareness
Temperature Control
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Off-Site Backup
Activity Log Monitoring
Penetration Testing
Redundant Systems
Test Back-up Recovery
Formal TSP Selection
Formal TSP Review
Business Continuity Plan Test
Business Continuity Plan
Internet History Monitoring
Internet History
Activity Logs
Maintenance Log Review
Uninterruptible Power Supply
Encrypt Transmitted Data
Temporarily Disable Absent Employee Accounts
Maintenance Logs
Line Disconnect
Access Log Monitoring
Spyware Protection
Virus Protection
Vulnerability Assessment: Administrative Privileges
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Authorized User Restrictions
Last Successful Logon
Forced Session Expiration
Change Default Security Settings
System Access Warning
Back-up Critical Data
Remove Unnecessary Software
Disable Unnecessary Services
Disable Terminated Employee Accounts
Access Logs
Formal Patching Process
Vulnerability Assessment
Encrypt Stored Data
Unique User Accounts
Strong Passwords
Intrusion Detection / Prevention
Multi-Factor Authentication
Content Filtering
Incident Response Program Test
Firewall
Incident Response Program
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Firewall:
Intrusion /Detection Prevention
Business Continuity Plan
Backup Generator
Temperature Control
Redundant Systems
Dual Power Supply
Network Diagram
Maintenance Logs
Maintenance Log Review
Activity Log Monitoring
Power Conditioning
Restricted Access Area
Encrypt Transmitted Data
Temporarily Disable Absent Employee Accounts
Access Log Monitoring
Uninterruptible Power Supply
Motion Sensors
Locked Door
Line Disconnect
Alert Reporting
Activity Logs
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Physical Security Awareness
Security Cameras
Monitored Location
Penetration Testing
Secured Rack/Cage
Authorized User Restrictions
Back-up Critical Data
Vulnerability Assessment: Administrative Privileges
Spyware Protection
Last Successful Logon
Forced Session Expiration
Change Default Security Settings
Incident Response Program Test
Access Logs
Virus Protection
Disable Terminated Employee Accounts
Incident Response Program
Unique User Accounts
Strong Passwords
Invalid Attempt Lockout
Disable Unnecessary Services
Vulnerability Assessment
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Change Default Account Settings
Formal Patching Process
Dust Filtering
Vulnerability Assessment
Change Default Account Settings
Formal Patching Process
Intrusion Detection / Prevention
Disable / Remove Hardware
Test Back-up Recovery
Off-Site Backup
Business Continuity Plan Test
Humidity Control

Funds Transfer System
Dual Power Supply
Business Continuity Plan Test
Business Continuity Plan
Penetration Testing
Maintenance Logs
Maintenance Log Review
Formal TSP Selection
Formal TSP Review
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Clear Screen Awareness
Monitor Placement
Inactive Lockout
Line Disconnect
Vulnerability Assessment: Administrative Privileges
Temporarily Disable Absent Employee Accounts

Encrypt Transmitted Data
Access Log Monitoring
Change Default Security Settings
Change Default Account Settings
Alert Reporting
Disable Unnecessary Services
Vulnerability Assessment
Last Successful Logon
Forced Session Expiration
Activity Log Monitoring
Encrypt Stored Data
System Access Warning
Firewall
Intrusion Detection / Prevention
Multi-Factor Authentication
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Activity Logs
Incident Response Program Test
Disable Terminated Employee Accounts
Unique User Accounts
Strong Passwords
Invalid Attempt Lockout
Incident Response Program
Authorized User Restrictions
Internet Banking Systems
Incidence Response Program
Monitored Location
Clear Screen Awareness
Uninterruptible Power Supply
Social Engineering Security Awareness
Physical Security Awareness
Penetration Testing
Maintenance Log Review
Maintenance Logs
Dual Power Supply
Line Disconnect
Test Back-up Recovery
Business Continuity Plan Test
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Monitor Placement
Temporarily Disable Absent Employee Accounts
Encrypt Transmitted Data
Business Continuity Plan
Spyware Protection
Activity Log Monitoring
Access Log Monitoring
Virus Protection
Back-up Critical Data
Vulnerability Assessment: Administrative Privileges
Activity Logs
Last Successful Logon
Forced Session Expiration
Change Default Security Settings
Encrypt Stored Data
Alert Reporting
Change Default Account Settings
Inactive Lockout
Disable Terminated Employee Accounts
Formal TSP Selection
Formal TSP Review
Formal Patching Process
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Authorized User Restrictions
Access Logs
Unique User Accounts
Firewall
Vulnerability Assessment
Strong Passwords
Incident Response Program Test
Intrusion Detection / Prevention
Multi-Factor Authentication
Invalid Attempt Lockout
Redundant Systems
No
Motion Sensors
Backup Generator
Temperature Control
Power Conditioning
Off-Site Backup
Network Diagram
Security Cameras
Restricted Access Area

Internet Website
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Incidence Response
Maintenance Logs
Maintenance Log Review
Forced Session Expiration
Encrypt Stored Data
Content Filtering
Clear Screen Awareness
Change Default Security Settings
Change Default Account Settings
Business Continuity Plan
Authorized User Restrictions
Unique User Accounts
Internet History Monitoring
Internet History
Encrypt Transmitted Data
System Access Warning
Virus Protection
Spyware Protection
Incident Response Program Test
Incident Response Program
Secured Rack/Cage
Dual Power Supply
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Multi-Factor Authentication
Firewall
Vulnerability Assessment: Administrative Privileges
Invalid Attempt Lockout
Intrusion Detection / Prevention
Strong Passwords
Vulnerability Assessment
Formal Patching Process
Formal TSP Selection
Formal TSP Review

Printer
Monitored Location
Restricted Access Area
Locked Door
Physical Security Awareness
Motion Sensors
Security Cameras

Router
Intrusion Detection & Prevention
Multi-Factor Authentication
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Business Continuity Plan Test
Business Continuity Plan
Backup Generator
Temperature Control
Humidity Control
Dust Filtering
Disable / Remove Hardware
Restricted Access Area
Redundant Systems
Network Diagram
Maintenance Logs
Maintenance Log Review
Line Disconnect
Invalid Attempt Lockout
Power Conditioning
Temporarily Disable Absent Employee Accounts
Motion Sensors
Locked Door
Access Log Monitoring
Uninterruptible Power Supply
Security Cameras
Monitored Location

186

Physical Security Awareness
Encrypt Transmitted Data
Secured Rack/Cage
Penetration Testing
Dual Power Supply
Spyware Protection
Alert Reporting
Authorized User Restrictions
Back-up Critical Data
Virus Protection
Vulnerability Assessment: Administrative
Privileges
Disable Terminated Employee Accounts
Firewall
Unique User Accounts
Strong Passwords
Incident Response Program Test
Incident Response Program
Change Default Account Settings
Change Default Security Settings
Disable Unnecessary Services
Vulnerability Assessment
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Switch
Intrusion Detection & Prevention
Multi-Factor Authentication
Business Continuity Plan Test
Business Continuity Plan
Backup Generator
Temperature Control
Humidity Control
Dust Filtering
Disable / Remove Hardware
Restricted Access Area
Redundant Systems
Network Diagram
Maintenance Logs
Maintenance Log Review
Line Disconnect
Invalid Attempt Lockout
Power Conditioning
Temporarily Disable Absent Employee Accounts
Motion Sensors
Locked Door
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Access Log Monitoring
Uninterruptible Power Supply
Security Cameras
Monitored Location
Physical Security Awareness
Encrypt Transmitted Data
Secured Rack/Cage
Penetration Testing
Dual Power Supply
Spyware Protection
Alert Reporting
Authorized User Restrictions
Back-up Critical Data
Virus Protection
Vulnerability Assessment: Administrative
Privileges
Disable Terminated Employee Accounts
Firewall
Unique User Accounts
Strong Passwords
Incident Response Program Test
Incident Response Program
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Change Default Account Settings
Change Default Security Settings
Disable Unnecessary Services
Vulnerability Assessment

Appendix F
Threats Specific to Assets
Internet Banking System
Data Leakage
Unauthorized System Access
Phishing
Defacement
Pharming
Eavesdropping / Sniffing
Intentional Misuse
Unauthorized Remote Access
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Degraded / Unavailable
Malicious Software
Outsourced
Unauthorized Physical Access
Unauthorized Viewing
User Error
Environmental Incident
Man-made / Natural Disaster

Core Banking System
Data Loss
Unauthorized System Access
Intentional Misuse
Outsourced
Unauthorized Remote Access
Degraded / Unavailable
Hardware Failure
Unauthorized Physical Access
Eavesdropping / Sniffing
Malicious Software
Unauthorized Viewing
Social Engineering
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Software Acquisition
Man-made / Natural Disaster
Environmental Incident
User Error
Funds Transfer System
Unauthorized System Access
Eavesdropping / Sniffing
Degraded / Unavailable
Malicious Software
Unauthorized Viewing
Intentional Misuse
Unauthorized Remote Access
User Error
Outsourced
Social Engineering
Man-made / Natural Disaster
Unauthorized Physical Access

Credit Bureau Website
User Error
Data Loss
Social Engineering
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Defacement
Intentional Misuse
Unauthorized Viewing
Eavesdropping / Sniffing
Unauthorized System Access
Outsourced
Degraded / Unavailable

Deposit Platform
Data Loss
Software Acquisition
Social Engineering
Intentional Misuse
Unauthorized System Access
Unauthorized Viewing
User Error
Man-made / Natural Disaster

Printers
Theft
Unauthorized physical access
Notebook Computers
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Data Loss
Theft
Intentional Misuse
Unauthorized Physical Access
Malicious Software
Connection Of Unauthorized Equipment
Social Engineering
Unauthorized Remote Access
Unauthorized Viewing
Hardware Failure
Environmental Incident
User Error
Unauthorized System Access
Degraded / Unavailable
Eavesdropping / Sniffing
Man-made / Natural Disaster
Firewall
Data Loss
Theft
Intentional Misuse
Unauthorized Physical Access
Malicious Software
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Connection Of Unauthorized Equipment
Social Engineering
Unauthorized Remote Access
Unauthorized Viewing
Hardware Failure
Environmental Incident
User Error
Unauthorized System Access
Degraded / Unavailable
Eavesdropping / Sniffing
Man-made / Natural Disaster

Lending Program
Social Engineering
Software Acquisition
User Error
Intentional Misuse
Unauthorized System Access
Unauthorized Viewing
Man-made / Natural Disaster
Data Loss
Marketing Software

195

Data Loss
Software Acquisition
Social Engineering
Unauthorized System Access
Unauthorized Viewing
User Error
Man-made / Natural Disaster
Intentional Misuse

Payday Lending
Unauthorized System Access
Data Loss
Eavesdropping / Sniffing
Defacement
Degraded / Unavailable
Unauthorized Viewing
Intentional Misuse
Social Engineering
User Error
Outsourced

Payroll
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Data Loss
Intentional Misuse
Social Engineering
Software Acquisition
Unauthorized System Access
User Error
Man-made / Natural Disaster
Unauthorized Viewing

PDA
Theft
Data Loss
Unauthorized System Access
Environmental Incident
Unauthorized Viewing
Malicious Software
Eavesdropping / Sniffing

Router
Unauthorized Physical Access
Eavesdropping / Sniffing
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Unauthorized Remote Access
Degraded / Unavailable
Hardware Failure
Connection Of Unauthorized Equipment
Unauthorized System Access
Environmental Incident
Man-made / Natural Disaster

Switch
Unauthorized Physical Access
Eavesdropping / Sniffing
Unauthorized Remote Access
Degraded / Unavailable
Hardware Failure
Connection Of Unauthorized Equipment
Unauthorized System Access
Environmental Incident
Man-made / Natural Disaster

Firewall
Unauthorized Remote Access
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Degraded / Unavailable
Hardware Failure
Connection Of Unauthorized Equipment
Unauthorized Physical Access
Environmental Incident
Theft
Man-made / Natural Disaster

Smart Phones
Theft
Data Loss
Unauthorized System Access
Environmental Incident
Unauthorized Viewing
Malicious Software
Eavesdropping / Sniffing

Terminal Services
Hardware Failure
Unauthorized Remote Access
Unauthorized System Access
Malicious Software
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User Error
Degraded / Unavailable
Theft
Man-made / Natural Disaster
Unauthorized Physical Access
Connection Of Unauthorized Equipment
Eavesdropping / Sniffing
Environmental Incident

Web Server
Hardware Failure
Social Engineering
Intentional Misuse
Malicious Software
Outsourced
Unauthorized System Access
Degraded / Unavailable
Unauthorized Physical Access
Unauthorized Remote Access
User Error
Theft
Environmental Incident
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Man-made / Natural Disaster
Connection Of Unauthorized Equipment
Eavesdropping / Sniffing

Email Server
Data Loss
Eavesdropping / Sniffing
Hardware Failure
Intentional Misuse
Social Engineering
Unauthorized System Access
Malicious Software
Outsourced
Theft
Unauthorized Physical Access
Unauthorized Remote Access
User Error
Man-made / Natural Disaster
Connection Of Unauthorized Equipment
Degraded / Unavailable
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Environmental Incident

Accounting Software
Data Loss
Social Engineering
Software Acquisition
Man-made / Natural Disaster
Intentional Misuse
Unauthorized System Access
User Error
Unauthorized Viewing

Background Checking
Data Loss
Defacement
Eavesdropping / Sniffing
Unauthorized System Access
User Error
Intentional Misuse
Social Engineering
Unauthorized Viewing
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Outsourced
Degraded / Unavailable

Anti Virus Software
Software Acquisition
Intentional Misuse
Man-made / Natural Disaster
Unauthorized System Access
User Error
Social Engineering

ATM
Connection Of Unauthorized Equipment
Skimming
Man-made / Natural Disaster
Theft

Call Reporting
Social Engineering
Software Acquisition
Intentional Misuse
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Man-made / Natural Disaster
Unauthorized System Access
User Error
Unauthorized Viewing

HMDA
Data Loss
Social Engineering
User Error
Software Acquisition
Intentional Misuse
Man-made / Natural Disaster
Unauthorized System Access
Unauthorized Viewing

Operating System
Malicious Software
Unauthorized System Access
Unauthorized Remote Access

Merchant Card Processing
Unauthorized System Access
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Eavesdropping / Sniffing
Degraded / Unavailable
Malicious Software
Unauthorized Viewing
Intentional Misuse
Unauthorized Remote Access
User Error
Outsourced
Social Engineering
Man-made / Natural Disaster
Unauthorized Physical Access

Intrusion Detection
Unauthorized System Access
Eavesdropping / Sniffing
Degraded / Unavailable
Malicious Software
Unauthorized Viewing
Intentional Misuse
Unauthorized Remote Access
User Error
Outsourced

205

Social Engineering
Man-made / Natural Disaster
Unauthorized Physical Access

File Server
Data Loss
Hardware Failure
Unauthorized System Access
Social Engineering
Theft
Degraded / Unavailable
Intentional Misuse
Malicious Software
Eavesdropping / Sniffing
Unauthorized Physical Access
Unauthorized Remote Access
User Error
Connection Of Unauthorized Equipment
Environmental Incident
Man-made / Natural Disaster

Item Imaging
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Data Loss
Unauthorized System Access
Hardware Failure
Degraded / Unavailable
Intentional Misuse
Outsourced
Unauthorized Remote Access
Social Engineering
Software Acquisition
Unauthorized Physical Access
Unauthorized Viewing
Eavesdropping / Sniffing
Environmental Incident
Malicious Software
Man-made / Natural Disaster
User Error

Local Area Network
Unauthorized Physical Access
Eavesdropping / Sniffing
Unauthorized Remote Access
Degraded / Unavailable
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Hardware Failure
Connection Of Unauthorized Equipment
Unauthorized System Access
Environmental Incident 1
Man-made / Natural Disaster

Check Ordering website
Unauthorized System Access
Intentional Misuse
Data Loss
Defacement
Degraded / Unavailable
Eavesdropping / Sniffing
Unauthorized Viewing
User Error
Outsourced
Social Engineering

Check Reader/Sorter
Data Loss
Intentional Misuse
Theft
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Unauthorized Viewing
User Error
Hardware Failure
Social Engineering
Environmental Incident
Unauthorized System Access
Malicious Software
Man-made / Natural Disaster
Unauthorized Physical Access
Unauthorized Remote Access
Connection Of Unauthorized Equipment
Degraded / Unavailable
Eavesdropping / Sniffing

VOIP
Connection Of Unauthorized Equipment
Unauthorized Physical Access
Unauthorized Remote Access
Eavesdropping / Sniffing
Unauthorized System Access
Degraded / Unavailable
Outsourced
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Hardware Failure
Man-made / Natural Disaster

Debit/Credit Cards
Unauthorized System Access
Eavesdropping / Sniffing
Degraded / Unavailable
Malicious Software
Unauthorized Viewing
Intentional Misuse
Unauthorized Remote Access
User Error
Outsourced
Social Engineering
Man-made / Natural Disaster
Unauthorized Physical Access

Bank Website
Unauthorized System Access
Data Loss
Defacement
Eavesdropping / Sniffing
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Unauthorized Viewing
Intentional Misuse
Social Engineering
Degraded / Unavailable
User Error
Outsourced

Application Server
Malicious Software
Unauthorized System Access
Theft
Degraded / Unavailable
Hardware Failure
User Error
Data Loss
Social Engineering
Unauthorized Physical Access
Unauthorized Remote Access
Intentional Misuse
Connection Of Unauthorized Equipment
Eavesdropping / Sniffing
Man-made / Natural Disaster
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Environmental Incident

Remote Capture
Data Loss
Unauthorized System Access
Hardware Failure
Eavesdropping / Sniffing
Degraded / Unavailable
Intentional Misuse
Outsourced
Unauthorized Remote Access
Social Engineering
Software Acquisition
Unauthorized Physical Access
Environmental Incident
Malicious Software
Unauthorized Viewing
Man-made / Natural Disaster
User Error

Storage Area Network
Unauthorized Physical Access
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Eavesdropping / Sniffing
Unauthorized Remote Access
Degraded / Unavailable
Hardware Failure
Connection Of Unauthorized Equipment
Unauthorized System Access
Environmental Incident
Man-made / Natural Disaster

Wide Area Network
Eavesdropping / Sniffing
Unauthorized Physical Access
Connection Of Unauthorized Equipment
Unauthorized Remote Access
Degraded / Unavailable
Environmental Incident
Hardware Failure
Unauthorized System Access
Man-made / Natural Disaster

Proof System
Unauthorized System Access
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Hardware Failure
Eavesdropping / Sniffing
Degraded / Unavailable
Data Loss
Outsourced
Unauthorized Remote Access
Social Engineering
Software Acquisition
Unauthorized Physical Access
Environmental Incident
Malicious Software
Unauthorized Viewing
Intentional Misuse
Man-made / Natural Disaster
User Error

